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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
RUSSELL DAVID HARRY, : Case No. 20070025-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(2002). Appellant Russell David Harry was convicted of possession/use of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
2005); and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, a class B misdemeanor under 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (2005). The judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court denied Harry a fair trial when it issued a supplemental 
instruction urging a deadlocked jury to agree on a verdict. 
Standard of Review: "The standard of review for jury instructions to which 
counsel has objected is correctness." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998); State v. Clements, 967 P.2d 957, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (considering the issue 
as a question of law); see also State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, f l7, 40 P.3d 611 (stating that 
a court will rely on the correctness standard to determine whether a trial court's decision 
to use a jury instruction may have impacted on the defendant's right to a fair trial). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue was preserved in the record on appeal at 295:227-30. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following authorities are relevant to the issue and set forth at Addendum B.-
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (Supp. 2007); Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (2007); ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury (,fABA Stds"), §15-5.4 (3d ed. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On November 15, 2005, the state charged Harry with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i); one count of driving under the influence, a class B misdemeanor offense under 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502; and two counts of violating the motor vehicles laws, 
including improper registration and faulty equipment, both class C misdemeanor 
offenses. (R. 1-3). 
On February 28, 2006, the trial court conducted a preliminary hearing and bound 
the case over for trial. (R. 28-29). On July 19, 2006, the jury trial began. (R. 112-14). 
On July 20, 2006, the court declared a mistrial and ordered a new trial. (R. 304:187). 
On September 11, 2006, the trial court began the second jury trial in the case. (R. 
201-02). On September 12, the jury began deliberations. After three hours and twenty-
four minutes, jurors advised the court they could not reach a unanimous verdict. (See R. 
204). At that point, the court gave a verdict-urging supplemental instruction over defense 
counsel's objections. (R. 295:227-233). Within twenty-six minutes, the jury returned a 
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guilty verdict on two counts against Harry: guilty of possession of a controlled substance, 
and guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. (R. 203-04; 242-43). 
On December 15, 2006, the trial court sentenced Harry to a suspended prison term 
on the felony count, and to a suspended jail term on the misdemeanor count, and ordered 
probation. (R. 269-71). On January 3, 2007, Harry filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. 
276); Utah R. App. P. 3 and 4 (2007). Harry is not incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State Presented the Following Evidence at Trial According to the state's 
evidence, on September 16, 2005, at midnight, Patrolman Jared Garcia was driving north-
bound on 200 East at 2900 South when he observed a cracked windshield in a brown 
Chevy Caprice traveling south. (R. 294:18-20). Also, he saw that the car did not have a 
front license plate. (R. 294:19). Garcia turned his car around and observed that the 
Chevy had an expired temporary permit. (R. 294:19). He activated his lights and pulled 
the driver over at 3050 South 200 East. (R. 294:20). The driver was Harry. 
Garcia asked for Harry's license, registration and insurance. (R. 294:20). He also 
noted that Harry's speech was "extremely slow," he was "hard to understand," and he was 
fidgety, breathing heavily, shaking and hunched over eating a sandwich. (R. 294:21). 
According to Garcia, Harry's "eyes were bloodshot, and his pupils appeared to be dilated. 
He also had pick-type marks or sores on his hand." (R. 294:21). Garcia considered those 
features to be "indicators of possible drug use." (R. 294:21). Garcia explained the 
indicators to Harry, and Harry said "he does not use drugs." (R. 294:21). According to 
Garcia, Harry later "explained that he occasionally use[d] marijuana." (R. 294:22). 
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Garcia had Harry "exit the vehicle" and they "walked to the rear [of] his vehicle, 
where [they] conducted field sobriety tests." (R. 294:22). Garcia considered Harry's 
balance to be poor. (R. 294:22). 
Garcia asked Harry to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, while Garcia 
watched for "four of six clues." (R. 294:23). If four clues are there, "the probability that 
a person's impairment is caused by alcohol or drugs is very high." (R. 294:24). In this 
case, Harry performed the test and Garcia observed "a total of two of the six clues." (R. 
294:25). Harry passed "this particular field sobriety test." (R. 294:27). 
Next, Garcia asked Harry to perform the nine-steps-walk-and-turn test, while 
Garcia watched for "eight clues." (R. 294:28). He listed them as follows: 
It's if a person can't keep their balance during instructions; if they start the test too 
soon; if they raise their arms; if they stop walking; if they don't do the turn the way 
that it's demonstrate or explained; if they miss heel to toe during the test; or they 
stop off the line during the test, then that's a clue. 
(R. 294:28). Garcia testified that the "arresting point on this test is two clues. In this situ-
ation I saw six of the eight clues when he performed this test. The only clues that I did 
not see [were] starting too soon and taking an improper amount of steps." (R. 294:28). 
Garcia then had Harry stand on one leg with both arms at his side and count out 
loud for 30 seconds. (R. 294:29). He watched for four clues: "if a person puts their foot 
down, if they sway, if they raise their arms up past six inches away from their body, or if 
they hop." (R. 294:29). Garcia saw three of the four clues. He did not see hopping. (Id.) 
Garcia also "checked for lack of convergence." He placed his finger on Harry's 
nose to see if Harry's eyes would converge or cross. (R. 294:30). According to Garcia, 
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Harry's eyes did not converge. Indeed, ff[s]ome peopled eyes normally will not do that, 
but most people's eyes will, unless there's something causing them not to." (R. 294:30). 
As a final matter, Garcia conducted the "Romberg Balance Test." He had Harry 
tilt his head back and "estimate the passing of 30 seconds." (R. 294:30-31). "Mr. Harry 
estimated the passing of 30 seconds in 36 seconds. The normal range is within 5 seconds. 
So he was just a little slow on that. Then [Garcia] observed eye tremors, which is a good 
indicator of methamphetamine." (R. 294:31). Garcia also checked Harry's pulse rate: it 
was "96 beats per minute or 84 beats a minute." (R. 294:32; see also R. 294:64 (stating 
Harry's pulse rate was 94)). Garcia considered that to be high. (Id.) 
After conducting the tests, Garcia placed Harry under arrest. He determined that 
Harry was "unable to safely operate a motor vehicle." (R. 294:33). Garcia asked Harry 
to spread his feet for a search then he placed handcuffs on Harry. (R. 294:34, 65). 
Garcia found no weapons or contraband. (R. 294: 36). He escorted Harry to the patrol 
car and showed Harry that nothing was in the back seat. "[I]t was completely empty." 
(R. 294:40). Garcia also informed Harry that if he had any drugs or paraphernalia, he 
could be charged with "an extra penalty" for taking it to the jail. (R. 294:40). 
Garcia left Harry in the patrol car and began an inventory search of Harry's car. 
(R. 294:41). While he was searching the Chevy, he could see Harry moving in the patrol 
car. "My vehicle was actually - 1 could see my vehicle moving." (R. 294:42). Garcia 
went back to his car and when he opened the door, he saw a "blue plastic bag that was 
right on the seat between the door and the seat." (R. 294:43). It was next to where Harry 
was sitting. (Id.) He pulled Harry out of the car and discovered two more clear plastic 
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bags. One was a "twist" with a white crystal substance. (R. 294:43-44). Harry told Garcia 
he did not know the plastic bags "were in his poncho." (R. 194:45). Also, he told Garcia 
he used methamphetamine earlier in the day and he was trying to hide the items to avoid 
trouble. (R. 294:46). Harry did not admit that the baggies belonged to him. (R. 294:75). 
Garcia took the items in evidence and transported Harry to the jail for a blood test. 
(R. 294:44). Amber Shide testified that she analyzed the blood. (R. 294:87, 96). She 
found "[b]lood amphetamine greater than 0.05 micrograms per milliliter, and blood 
methamphetamine greater than 0.05 micrograms per milliliter." (R. 294:96). Shide 
testified that the reports basically indicated positive for drugs in the blood system "at 
some point." (R. 294:99). Also, the substance in a plastic baggie tested positive for 
methamphetamine. (See R. 294:125, 132). 
Harry Testified in His Defense. Harry stated that on September 16, 2005, at 5:00 
p.m., he was driving his car and ran out of gas. (R. 294:146). He pushed the car to a 
parking lot and went to find money. (R. 294:147). He sorted through dumpsters for 
salvage (R. 294:148), and he found an inhaler in a dumpster at an "old folks home." (R. 
294:149). It had a prescription label on it. (R. 294:150). He used it throughout the day 
because he had trouble breathing and it helped him breathe better. (R. 294:149-50). 
Harry eventually got money (R. 294:147-48), but did not want to run out of gas 
again, so he drove slowly. (Id.) He was driving on 200 East toward the movie theaters. 
(R. 294:151). He intended to sleep in the theater parking lot because, with cameras there, 
he "wouldn't have to worry about somebody messing" with him or his stuff. (See R. 
294:151). On his way to the parking lot, he was stopped by Garcia. (R. 294:148). 
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When Garcia pulled him over, Harry was extremely tired and nervous (R. 294: 
153-55). Also, he had bloodshot eyes and trouble breathing due to allergies. (Id.) He 
had injuries or sores on his hands from grabbing metal and jumping in and out of dump-
sters (R. 294:156), and he had rheumatoid arthritis in his left foot. (R. 294:154). As 
Garcia took him through the sobriety tests, Harry thought he was doing well. (Id.) After 
Garcia arrested him, Garcia conducted a thorough search of Harry. (R. 294:156). 
He searched Harry's arms, sleeves, and pocket. (R. 294:156). Garcia then 
handcuffed Harry and placed him in the patrol car. (R. 294:156). Harry moved back and 
forth in the car to readjust the handcuffs because they were "tight and uncomfortable." 
(R. 294:157). At that point, Garcia came back to the car and "held up a baggie and 
asked" what it was. Harry did not know. (R. 294:157). Garcia then walked around the 
car and came back with two more baggies. (R. 294:157). Harry had never seen the 
baggies before. (R. 294:158). He tried to tell Garcia that he had used the inhaler that 
day. (Id.) Also, he denied possessing methamphetamine (see R. 294:157-58, 168), and 
he maintained that he was driving slowly but in a safe way. (R. 294:159). 
The Jury Was Deadlocked. At the conclusion of trial, the jury deliberated for three 
hours and twenty-four minutes. (See R. 204). Jurors then advised the court they had 
reached a decision on the charge of driving under the influence, but were deadlocked 
"seven to one on Count I" for possession. (R. 295:227). 
Over defense counsel's objections, the trial court brought jurors back into the 
courtroom and gave them a supplemental "Allen" charge. It instructed the jury that the 
trial had been expensive in terms of "time, effort and money to both the defense and the 
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prosecution" and further proceedings "would only serve to increase the costs to both 
sides." (R. 295:231). Also, it asked "dissenting" juror(s) for acquittal to consider 
whether their decision was reasonable, where other "equally conscientious fellow jurors" 
did not share in those impressions. (R. 295:232). In addition, the court advised jurors 
against acquittal to consider whether they "do not have a reason to doubt" the correction 
of their judgment; and whether they should "distrust the weight and sufficiency of 
evidence" which had failed to convince several other fellow jurors. (R. 295: 232-33). 
After the instruction, the jury returned to the jury room and within 26 minutes it 
rendered a guilty verdict on both counts. (R. 204). Harry is challenging the supplemental 
verdict-urging charge in this case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court gave the deadlocked jury a supplemental instruction urging it to 
reach a unanimous verdict. Such an instruction is referred to as an "Allen" charge. 
Courts have criticized use of the Allen charge in its various forms, where such a charge 
serves to coerce a verdict, places undue pressure on a dissenting juror, contains incorrect 
statements of law, is invasive, and/or is irrelevant and improper. 
Utah courts have had limited opportunity to assess whether a trial court may use 
an Allen charge on a deadlocked jury. In State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), this Court stated that it would approve of such use where the Allen charge is "non-
coercive." IcL at 30. This Court also ruled that in assessing the charge, it would look to 
(1) whether the language of the charge was coercive per se, and (2) whether the charge 
was coercive under the circumstances of the case. IdL 
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Considering the Lactod analysis here, the trial court gave a variation on the Allen 
charge that was coercive per se. The supplemental charge overemphasized the 
importance of agreement, it placed undue pressure on a dissenting juror, it contained 
incorrect statements of law, it contained improper and irrelevant information, it 
commented on the evidence, and it invaded the province of the jury. Under the first part 
of the Lactod analysis, the instruction was improper. Under the second part of the Lactod 
analysis, the instruction as a whole and under the circumstances of the case was coercive 
and unreasonable. Indeed, the record supports that the instruction pressured the jury to 
change its position to a guilty verdict. That was inappropriate. 
Harry respectfully requests that this Court disavow use of the Allen charge in its 
various forms in this jurisdiction, and support use of the American Bar Association 
standards for deadlocked juries. In addition, Harry requests that this Court reject the 
instruction here and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DENIED HARRY A FAIR TRIAL WHEN IT ISSUED 
A SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION URGING A DEADLOCKED JURY 
TO AGREE ON A VERDICT. 
Harry maintains the trial court erred when it gave a deadlocked jury a supplemen-
tal instruction urging it to reach a unanimous verdict. Such an instruction is referred to as 
an "Allen" or "dynamite" charge. See People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997, 1000 (Cal. 1977). 
The traditional "Allen charge" has a history that dates back to 1896, when the 
United States Supreme Court issued Allen v. United States\ 164 U.S. 492 (1896). See 
infra, Argument A.l., herein. Since that decision, several courts have addressed the 
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validity of the charge, finding the language to be coercive, incorrect, irrelevant, improper, 
and invasive. See infra. Argument A.2., herein. Many jurisdictions have prohibited use 
of the Allen charge in all its forms. hL 
In more recent times, the American Bar Association ("ABA") has promulgated 
guidelines for use with a deadlocked jury in a criminal case. See uL_ The guidelines are 
non-coercive and balanced. Courts favor their use. See_ iji_ In 1988, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld a supplemental verdict-urging instruction in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 
484 U.S. 231 (1988), that embodied concepts set forth in the ABA standards. IcL at 234-
35. Utah courts should likewise embrace the ABA standards. 
As further set forth below, the verdict-urging instruction that the trial court used 
here relied on coercive and improper concepts based on the traditional Allen charge. 
Such an instruction should be prohibited. It is coercive per se and it is coercive under the 
circumstances of this case. See infra, Argument B., herein. 
A. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT FIRST CONSIDERED A 
VERDICT-URGING INSTRUCTION IN ALLEN V. UNITED STATES. 
COURTS HAVE SINCE FOUND SUCH INSTRUCTIONS TO BE COERCIVE, 
OPTING INSTEAD TO FOLLOW STANDARDS PROMULGATED BY THE 
ABA. 
1. The United States Supreme Court First Addressed the Supplemental Verdict-
Urging Instruction in 1896. 
In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the United States Supreme Court 
considered the validity of a supplemental charge that the trial court gave to a deadlocked 
jury. IcL at 501. The pertinent text of the supplemental charge stated the following: 
The only mode provided by our Constitution and laws for deciding questions of 
fact in criminal cases is by the verdict of a jury. In a large proportion of cases, and 
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perhaps, strictly speaking, in all cases, absolute certainty can not be attained or 
expected. Although the verdict to which a juror agrees must, of course, be his own 
verdict, the result of his own convictions, and not a mere acqui[e]s[c]ence in the 
conclusion of his fellows, yet, in order to bring twelve minds to a unanimous 
result, you must examine the questions submitted to you with candor, and with a 
proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other. You should consider 
that the case must, at some time, be decided; that you are selected in the same 
manner, and from the same source from which any future jury must be; and there 
is no reason to suppose that the case will ever be submitted to twelve men more 
intelligent, more impartial, or more competent to decide it; or that more or clearer 
evidence will be produced on the one side or the other. And with this view it is 
your duty to decide the case if you can conscientiously do so. In order to make a 
decision more practicable the law imposes the burden of proof on one party or the 
other in all cases. In the present case the burden of proof is upon the Government 
of the United States. But in conferring together you ought to pay proper respect to 
each other's opinions, and listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's 
arguments. And, on the one hand, if much the larger number of your panel are for 
a conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether a doubt in his own mind 
is a reasonable one which makes no impression upon the the [sic] minds of so 
many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself, and who have heard 
the same evidence with the same attention, with an equal desire to arrive at the 
truth, and under the sanction of the same oath. And, on the other hand, if a 
majority are for acquittal, the minority ought seriously to ask themselves whether 
they may not reasonably, and ought not to, doubt the correctness of a judgment 
which is not concurred in by most of those with whom they are associated, and 
distrust the weight or sufficiency of that evidence which fails to carry conviction 
to the minds of their fellows. 
State v. Howard, 537 N.E.2d 188, 191 n.3 (Ohio 1989) (citing Brief of the United States, 
filed with the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, October 21, 1896). In assessing 
the instruction, the Supreme Court stated that while a verdict "should represent the 
opinion of each individual juror,'1 opinions may change during conference in the jury 
room; and the "object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views 
and by arguments among the jurors themselves." Allen, 164 U.S. at 501. 
Also, it stated, "It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with 
deference to the arguments, and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large 
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majority of the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself." Id_ 
A juror may not proceed with "a blind determination that the verdict shall represent his 
opinion of the case at that moment, or that he should close his ears to the arguments of 
men who are equally honest and intelligent as himself." IcL at 501-02. In 1896, the 
Supreme Court upheld the original supplemental Allen charge. IcL 
2. Courts Have Criticized Use of the Allen Charge; Thus, the ABA Has 
Promulgated Standards for Instructing a Deadlocked Jury in a Criminal Case. 
Several decades after the Supreme Court issued the Allen decision, federal 
appellate courts and state courts criticized the charge in its various forms as coercive, an 
incorrect statement of the law, invasive, and irrelevant. See e.g.. United States v. 
FioravantU 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); United States v. 
Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Green v. United States. 309 F.2d 852, 854-56 
(5th Cir. 1962); see also Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 836-40 (Alaska 1971) (rejecting a 
variation on the Allen charge that admonished the jury that a criminal trial must end in a 
verdict; and maintaining that f,[m]uch of what was generally accepted" when Allen was 
decided in 1896 "is not good law today"), overruled on other grounds as recognized in 
State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 944 (Alaska 1987); State v. Thomas, 342 P.2d 197, 200 
(Ariz. 1959) (stating that the supplemental instruction "shall no longer be tolerated" or 
approved by this court); Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1004, 1006 & n.16 (rejecting an Allen-type 
charge where it admonished jurors to consider improper and irrelevant information and it 
contained an incorrect statement of law); Taylor v. People, 490 P.2d 292, 295 (Colo. 
1971) (stating "this court issued an order" directing trial courts "not to use the 'Allen 
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charge' after the date of such order"); People v. Prim. 289 N.E.2d 601, 607-08 (111. 
1972) (recognizing that criticism surrounding Allen charge deals with coercive language 
urging jurors in minority to re-evaluate their positions); Lewis v. State, 424 N.E.2d 107, 
110-11 (Ind. 1981) (recognizing problems with the Allen charge); State v. Nicholson, 315 
So.2d 639, 641-43 (La. 1975) (ruling that use of modified A lien charge is impermissible); 
Goodmuth v. State, 490 A.2d 682, 687 (Md. 1985) (stating the trial courts erred in giving 
an Allen charge); State v. Martin, 211 N.W.2d 765, 769-70 (Minn. 1973) (ruling that 
language in an Allen charge is no longer permissible); Gearlson v. State, 482 So.2d 
1141, 1143 (Miss. 1986) (ruling that "Allen charge in any of its various forms should not 
be given"); State v. Randall 353 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Mont. 1960) (stating the "inevitable 
effect" of an Allen instruction "would be to suggest to the minority members of the jury 
that they ought to surrender their own convictions and follow the majority"); State v. 
Garza, 176 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Neb. 1970) (rejecting Allen-type instruction); State v. 
Czachor, 413 A.2d 593, 598 (NJ. 1980) (stating, "the Allen charge conveys both blunt 
and subtle pressure upon the jury, pressure which is inconsistent with jury freedom and 
responsibility"; "[w]e accordingly hold that such a charge containing coercive features 
should not be given to a jury in the trial of a criminal case"); Azbill v. State, 495 P.2d 
1064, 1069 (Nev. 1972) (finding no error in pre-deliberation Allen charge, but insisting 
"that the 'dynamite or Allen Charge' should be avoided and that there should be an 
abandonment of all judicial interference injury deliberations"). 
Courts have criticized the Allen-type charge because, among other things, it places 
too much pressure on jurors in the minority view during deliberations. See_ Prim, 289 
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N.E.2d at 607-08; Martin. 211 N.W.2d at 769 (stating that a primary criticism of the 
Allen charge is that it emphasizes an obligation on minority jurors to reconsider their 
position "without imposing the same obligation on the majority"); Randall, 353 P.2d at 
1058 (stating that the "inevitable effect of the instruction" is that it suggests to minority 
members of the jury "that they ought to surrender their own convictions and follow the 
majority"); see also Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1004, 1006; Nicholson, 315 So.2d at 642 (stating 
the charge is confusing and "fails in its balancing attempt"; it effectively urges 
conformity with the majority (or near majority) view; and it discredits the position of the 
minority "if the minority is less than substantial"). 
In addition, it interjects improper information into deliberations and "dangerously 
approaches commenting on the evidence." Lewis, 424 N.E.2d at 110-11 (recognizing 
problems with the Allen charge where it advises jurors that "[t]here is no reason to 
believe that the case can be tried again any better or more exhaustively than it has been" 
and "[tjhere is no reason to believe that more evidence or clearer evidence would be 
produced on behalf of either side"; such language approaches commenting on the 
evidence, and a judge "must refrain from imposing himself and his opinions on the 
jury"); see also Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1006 & n.16 (Cal. 1977) (rejecting anyJ//e/?-type 
charge where it improperly encouraged jurors "to consider the numerical division" in 
reexamining their views; also stating it is "simply not true" that a criminal case must be 
decided at some time since "a hung jury is an inevitable by-product" of a unanimity 
requirement; and noting that a reference to the expense and inconvenience of retrial is 
"irrelevant to the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence," and hence impermissible). 
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Also, the charge invades the province of the jury and deprives a defendant of a fair 
trial. Garza, 176 N.W.2d at 667 (stating that the court invaded the province of the jury 
by making it 'Very clear that in its judgment a verdict could and should be arrived at"; 
this invasion "prevented the defendant from having his fate determined by an impartial 
and uncoerced jury"). 
As a result of the criticisms, the American Bar Association promulgated a 
procedure for courts to follow in the case of a deadlocked jury. The ABA standards state 
the following: 
Standard 15-5.4. Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury 
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which 
informs the jury: 
(1) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto; 
(2) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with 
a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to 
individual judgment; 
(3) that each juror must decide the case for himself or herself but only after 
an impartial consideration of the evidence with the other jurors; 
(4) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to 
reexamine his or her own views and change an opinion if the juror is 
convinced it is erroneous; and 
(5) that no juror should surrender his or her honest belief as to the weight or 
effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of the other jurors, or 
for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may 
require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an 
instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court should not require or threaten 
to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for 
unreasonable intervals. 
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(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it appears 
that there is no reasonable probability of agreement. 
ABA Stds, § 15-5.4 (included herein as part of Addendum B). 
The ABA standards are reasonable and non-coercive. See, e.g., id., Commentary. 
They are balanced and make no reference to jurors in a minority view in deliberations. 
Id. The commentary to the standards suggests that prior to deliberations, the court should 
instruct the jury Mon the nature of its duties." IcL "No particular language need be used, 
but section (a) sets out five points on which a jury might properly be advised." M (citing 
to Instruction 8.11 of Jury Instructions and Forms for Fed. Crim. Cases, 27 F.R.D. 39, 97-
98 (1961), as "illustrative of an instruction consistent with Standard 15-5.4(a)"). 
In addition, the commentary suggests that in the case of a deadlocked jury, the 
court should repeat an instruction to jurors reiterating their responsibilities as set forth in 
the standards. "This may be done when the jury has indicated its inability to reach an 
agreement or has deliberated for some time without reaching an agreement." IcL 
Even where courts have upheld the Allen-type instruction in a given case, they 
have disavowed use of the instruction in future cases, opting instead for compliance with 
the ABA procedures. In State v. Marsh, the Oregon Supreme Court stated, "[W]e agree 
with the view that the giving of the 'Allen charge,' even when 'modified' and 'balanced,' 
involves so many 'pitfalls1 and is such an invitation to error as to cause more trouble in 
the administration of justice than it is worth. We thus agree with those courts which have 
disapproved the future use of such supplemental instructions to deadlocked juries in 
criminal cases." 490 P.2d 491, 503 (Or. 1971) (notes omitted) (approving "the 
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supplemental instruction proposed by the ABA Project"). See^ State v. Ortega, 531 P.2d 
756, 758 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (recognizing that trial courts may give instructions 
approved in Marsh to deadlocked juries); Prim* 289 N.E.2d at 609-610 (ruling that trial 
court faced with deadlocked jury should comply with standards suggested by American 
Bar Association Minimum Standards Relating to Jury Trials); State v. White, 285 A.2d 
832, 838 (Me. 1972) (recommending against use of the Mien charge or any modified 
form thereof after the jury has commenced deliberations in any criminal case and 
adopting the ABA standards as the recommended practice); Goodmuth, 490 A.2d at 686 
(reiterating that courts comply with ABA standards); People v. Hardin, 365 N.W.2d 101, 
102-03 (Mich. 1984) (recognizing adoption of ABA standards) (cites omitted); Martin, 
211 N.W.2d at 771-73 (adopting ABA standard for use in the trial courts); Czachor, 413 
A.2d at 598, 599 (ruling that court's use of conventional Allen charge on three occasions 
was improper; also finding such a charge to be invalid and recommending use of ABA 
standards); Wilkins v. State, 609 P.2d 309, 312-13 (Nev. 1980) (stating that ff[i]n the past, 
this Court has reluctantly approved the Allen charge11 under certain circumstances; also 
recognizing that where the instruction has been barely acceptable, "we hereby expressly 
approve the American Bar Association's version of the Allen charge"); State v. 
Champagne, 198 N.W.2d 218, 238-40 (N.D. 1972) (recommending that trial courts in the 
future use the ABA standards instruction where it makes no reference to jurors in the 
minority but instead charges all jurors to consult with one another, and it does not have 
the coercive impact of the Allen charge); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 275 A.2d 299, 304-
05 (Pa. 1971) (recognizing that the Allen charge contains potential abuses, and that the 
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charge "should not be employed by the trial judges of this Commonwealth after the date 
of this opinion11; commending the ABA standards for courts to follow when juries are 
deadlocked); State v. Patriarch 308 A.2d 300, 322 (R.I. 1973) (ruling that the verdict-
urging charge would be upheld; but recognizing a "need for a solution to forestall 
continued litigation over the validity" of the Allen charge and stating that such a solution 
is found in the ABA Project); Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1975) (rejecting 
Allen charge and requiring compliance with ABA standards); Thomas, 449 F.2d at 1187; 
United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933-34 (7th Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 
1017 (1970); see also Lowenfield v. Phelps. 484 U.S. 231, 237-38, 240-41 (1988) (giving 
continuing validity to the observations made in Allen that the object of the jury system is 
to secure unanimity through a comparison of views and arguments, that each juror should 
listen with deference to others and distrust for his own judgment, and that jurors cannot 
go into the jury room with a "blind determination," and closing their ears to the 
arguments of others; also, upholding an AB A-type instruction given in Lowenfield's case 
and recognizing that the instruction was "by no means" identical to the Allen charge). 
The Allen-typo instruction is fraught with criticism due to the threat it carries of 
coercion. The courts in this jurisdiction should put an end to the use of such a 
supplemental instruction with deadlocked juries. 
3. Utah Courts Have Had Limited Opportunity to Address the Allen Charge. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not expressly disavowed use of the Allen 
charge in this jurisdiction, it has acknowledged that such a charge has the potential of 
being coercive. See e.g.. State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1022 n.l, 1023 (Utah 1987) 
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(recognizing that "many courts have expressed concern about the continued propriety of 
the [Allen] instruction because of its perceived tendency to pressure jurors to give up their 
sincere convictions simply because a majority takes a different view"; but ruling that the 
yl//e/?-charge issue was not properly preserved below). 
In State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
Allen instructions have been "criticized as tending to pressure jurors into giving up their 
sincere convictions merely because a majority reached a different conclusion." IcL at 
861. "We acknowledge that a supplemental instruction has the potential to be coercive, 
depending on its content, if given to jurors who have reached an impasse." IcL 
In that case, the trial court gave an instruction to jurors prior to deliberations 
stating the following: 
The Court instructs the Jury that although the verdict to which each Juror agrees 
must, of course, be each Juror[']s own conclusion, and not a mere acquiescence in 
the conclusion of fellow Jurors yet, in order to bring eight minds to a unanimous 
result the Jurors should examine with candor the questions submitted to them, with 
due regard and deference to the opinions of each other. A dissenting Juror should 
consider whether their state of mind is a reasonable one, when it makes no 
impression on the minds of so many Jurors equally honest, equally intelligent, who 
have heard the same evidence, with an equal desire to arrive at the truth, under the 
sanction of the same oath. You are not to give up a conscientious conclusion after 
you have reached such a conclusion finally, but it is your duty to confer with your 
fellow Jurors carefully and earnestly, and with a desire to do absolute justice both 
to the State and to the Defendant. 
IcL at 861. The supreme court ruled that where the instruction was "given prior to jury 
deliberations," the danger that such an instruction would coerce jurors "is dissipated, if 
not lost." IcL (citing State v. Wilson, 627 P.2d 1185 (Kan. Ct. App.), affd and remanded, 
634 P.2d 1078 (Kan. 1981)). 
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In State v. Thomas, 111 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989), a jury deliberated a charge of rape 
for three hours before sending a message to the trial court that it "had reached an impasse 
at six to two, without indicating whether this was for acquittal or conviction." IcL at 447. 
The trial court gave jurors an oral supplemental instruction to the effect "that three hours 
was 'not a very long time' to consider a case of this nature and that the jury should 
'reconvene and see if you can't solve your problems and reach a verdict.'" M. 
After conviction, defendant appealed, claiming it was error for the court to give an 
oral instruction: it should have sent a written instruction into the jury room telling jurors 
to "continue their deliberations." IcL at 448. The supreme court found no error and ruled 
that bringing jurors into the courtroom for the instruction was not coercive. IcL It also 
stated, "The instruction was not directed specifically toward the minority jurors, nor was 
there any suggestion that the jurors should surrender their individual views of conscience. 
Criticism which has been leveled at giving an Allen charge simply is not applicable here." 
K 
In State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court recognized the 
controversy surrounding Allen-typo instructions. There jurors deliberated for five hours 
on a charge for sexual abuse of a child before indicating they were "having trouble 
reaching a verdict." IcL at 28. At that point, without warning to counsel, the trial court 
gave a "verdict-urging instruction." IcL at 28. The trial court stated the following: 
I need to have a chat with you folks. I understand you are having a difficult time in 
there. I'm getting nods of heads yes. I want to encourage you as best you can to 
reach some kind of agreement, and the reason is simple. If you don't reach an 
agreement and the jury hangs up and cannot come to any kind of agreement we get 
to send you folks home and reschedule this whole thing and start over again. Now, 
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I'm sure you don't w Jit to do that. I'm sure we don't want to do that either, because 
one problem is I'm only going to be here another six or eight weeks and we don't 
have another day to do this case. We would very much like to get a settlement out 
of this matter if we can. Now, you add up the time we have all got involved in this 
case and we have got two or three weeks into it figuring all our individual time. I 
want you to go back and give it another effort. Be open minded, understanding. Be 
compromising as best you can without surrendering your honest and true feelings, 
because we don't want you to go in there and let everybody walk all over you. But 
on the other hand if there's any way possible to reach an agreement let us know. If 
not then I'm not going to let you go too much longer. But I think if you give it 
another shot maybe you can. It's worked before on lots of other jurys [sic], and I 
hope it will tonight because I certainly don't want to throw away this day. You 
folks have put too much time and effort into it, as well as these folks out here 
whose day it is. So if you folks will go back to the jury room and take a few deep 
breaths and relax and start over again, I would really appreciate it. Okay? 
ut. 'x: leliberated an hour and fifteen minutes more to find defendant guilty. 
Id. "Defendant's counsel did not object to this instruction either before or after it was 
given." IcL Nevertheless, this Court addressed whether " 
.:.»^ - »• ^ ' - I uVvther the instruction 'Tiven "was acceptable." Id. at 29. 
It recognized that jurisdictions have abandoned the Allen charge. M, a* 29. Also 
it recognized thai ine AB.- v nas suggested that such instructions be given before the jury 
retire- ^M-J.-.i- --» :
 ; K ^v:yt :; •- . . .. u m h l i -h>:< - =;• : *' i c^':r1 m;-v require 
the jury to continue its deliberation and may give or repeat an appropriate instruction." IcL 
at 30 (citing ABA Standards Relating iw i ^ ai L>\ jury, § i . -\). 
rN
'- '• •
 ]rf
 - t - . - . f r ' . - l ' . , ' ! i i . r - ; - .•• ' : ". ^
 : .'-IV'-VO" Alien charge "because we be-
lieve such charges to be a reasonable and proper exercise of the court's power to guide the 
jury to a fair and impartial verdict. We also recognize the other legitimate purposes 
sei vedby such a cl lai ge, i \i i nel> , ftl I = i , oiilaiice of the soc: i : tal c^  :)sts :)f a retrial' 1: otl i ii I 
time and money, and the 'possible loss of evidence that a new trial would entail.'" IdL 
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The Court specified that in reviewing a supplemental verdict-urging charge, it 
would consider (1) whether the language of the charge "can properly be said to be 
coercive" per se and (2) whether it is coercive under the circumstances of the case. IdL 
Under the first step, this Court identified "inherently coercive ideas which should 
not be included in an Allen charge." IdL at 31. 
The United States Supreme Court expressly disapproved an instruction which 
stated, in part, that "[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case." Jenkins, 380 
U.S. at 446, 85 S.Ct. at 1060. It is a misstatement of law that a criminal case must 
be decided at some time. Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1006. Further, the instruction, in the 
light of the circumstances under which it is given, "should not overemphasize the 
importance of an agreement, suggest that any juror surrender his independent 
judgment, or say or do anything from which the jury could possibly infer that the 
court is indicating anxiety for or demanding some verdict, or subjecting the jury to 
the hardships of long deliberations." State v. Thomas. 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197, 
200 (1959). While it is well-established that the length of time a jury may be kept 
together for deliberation is discretionary with the trial judge, he may not coerce the 
jury into returning a verdict because this amounts to a denial of a fair and impartial 
jury trial and is, therefore, a denial of due process. Mills v. Tinsley, 314 F.2d 311, 
313 (10th Cir. 1963). 
IdL at 31; see also Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (ensuring due process); Foote v. Ut. Bd, of 
Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that the state due process clause is 
"comprehensive in its application to all activities for state government"); Utah Const, art. 
I, § 12 (ensuring the right to an impartial jury trial). 
The Court also gave credence to an instruction that would "appropriately 
admonish the jury to 'deliberate together in an atmosphere of mutual deference and 
respect giving due consideration to the views of others in the knowledge that in the end 
their verdict must reflect the composite views of all.'" Lactod, 761 P.2d at 30. That 
admonition may be counterbalanced with language to jury members "to not give up their 
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conscientiously held opinions." IcL at 31. The instruction also may remind jurors "of the 
presumption oi cicicnuanu . .R-.VML. • • . ;>:• •». iin}A>^.i 'j^on hie Mte." 
Id. (cites omitted). 
In Lactod's case, the Court considered the first step. It identified potentially 
coercive staLcnicjii-;:M-J a a i r i i ) \\LiV. i-\i'ii\± . * ^WM-..;- - ^ > 
A/, at 31 (stating that "[a m h ou^h" thejudge stated that jurors and parties had invested 
substantial time in the case, "he was only stating the obvious"; and the judge's statement 
about oemg on L.I^  ** : * ,<aia i* latements that 
jurors should compromise without surrendering their feelings and they should not let 
"everybody walk all over you," but should reach agreement "it there's any way possible"). 
I he Court ruled that the supplement I.I&LUU • u. 
It then considered the analysis under the second step: "[W]e must consider, under 
the specific circumstances of the case, whether the charge was proper after the jury had 
reported an inability to reach a verdict.'""1 JcL A J I, 'I JK I ' ml lui il.nl In .lit) v ulloqii) 
i^u**- :• 'V ;• !- - s \:- -/ foreman, circumstances surrounding the giving of the 
instruction, and consideration of the American Bar Association Standards on Criminal 
justice Relating to tnai i -^ry. ui. JCUL. oimucu). 
Baser! ;•- considerations, this Court determined that there had been no 
significant colloquy between the judge and jury foreman. IdL Also, the jury continued to 
deliberate for an hour and iiiteen minutes after receiving the supplen.JU'.<:L HUH-^\ .- .. L-
,.,,_..,,,,,. •;. . > ., in:frr,f!\' ^ ••liesce to the major!!v " K In 
addition, the judge did not threaten to or keep the jury in deliberations for an unreason-
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able period. IcL And the instruction was within "the ABA-recommended standards for 
verdict-urging instructions." IcL Under the second step of the analysis, this Court upheld 
the charge as merely encouraging jurors "to reach an agreement, if possible." IcL at 32. 
Finally, in State v. Clements, this Court reiterated that a two-tiered analytical 
scheme applies when the trial court gives a supplemental, verdict-urging instruction after 
a jury "has announced it is deadlocked." 967 P.2d 957, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (stating 
on review this Court will consider whether the supplemental instruction was coercive per 
se or under the specific circumstances of the case) (citing Lactod, 761 P.2d at 30-31). In 
Clements, the jury did not announce a deadlock and the court did not provide a verdict-
urging instruction. Clements, 967 P.2d at 959. Thus, the Lactod analysis was 
inapplicable there. IcL at 959-60; see also State v. Kotz, 758 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (stating defendant did not raise any objection to the supplemental instructions). 
Based on the above cases, Utah courts have not had the opportunity to consider the 
specific coercive language found in the Allen-type instruction provided to the jury in this 
case. The instruction here had the potential to be, and was, coercive per se. This Court 
should disavow its use in this jurisdiction. In addition, under the circumstances of this 
case, the instruction was coercive, it placed undue pressure on a single juror, and it had 
the effect of depriving Harry of a fair trial and the individual decision of each juror. 
B. THE SUPPLEMENTAL CHARGE HERE CONTAINED COERCIVE AND 
IRRELEVANT LANGUAGE, AND IT HAD THE EFFECT OF PLACING 
UNDUE PRESSURE ON A SINGLE JUROR AND DEPRIVING HARRY OF A 
NON-COERCED VERDICT. 
Harry maintains the trial court improperly exerted pressure on the jury to reach 
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unanimity on the felony count for possession. According to the record, jury selection 
began o:: Liic iii>i .; _ \^cc J\. '- • , 1 
evidence on that day. (R. 294). On the second day of trial, the jury heard closing 
arguments and closing instructions (R. 295), and at 11:54 a.m., it began deliberating the 
evidence, anc ai-c ^:-u: :, - -^cs foi posses^*.-* .; ^ • .' v i, 
under the influence. (R. 203-04). 
During deliberations the jury sent a note to the court "containing five questions." 
(K. J V ^ : 2 2 7 , J , O J ; . I - . J nd^r-v*- •• •••:•>> ii::i( •>'. ,-:\ n . ^ v : \ * .*d : , r r " ' ^ 
evidence that it's going to receive. Please rely on your individual and collective 
memories for what the evidence was." (R. 295:227; 265). 
x A .:.'. i ; • , UiC S.K,J.: : . , : LCU u i : u ^:\i^\\i\. . - I L * U S U ' - . - . . IUI ^ L •-. >L 
<i«-ivin:-f under the influence, but was deadlocked "seven to one on Count I" for posses-
sion. (R. 204; 295:227). The court asked for recommendations from counsel, and when 
the attorneys indicated they had not encountered u ;c \ a sj-umcn Dcioru, .:iw w u^ : -. ^ J. 
'• - --- '
j
 '.'itl^r rhv1 ;-.- ;i • • -in! or i^,uj an Allen-type instruction. (R. 295:227-28). 
The court acknowledged that Allen instructions are "fraught" with criticism. (Id.) 
Also, the court advised counsel that the instruction h ^ c \ .;.» IIUCIK:^.: ;U u-h L:K ->JC 
hr.iiiiiut,," for acquittal that, "you know, you might want to think about that. On the other 
hand, if there's a substantial number for acquittal - or not even a substantial number. If 
there's some number for acquittal, given the reasonable do^ui ^lanaa; j , you might wai it 
t : • tl ill il :: a b c I i t h :> v* T yoi i c> : i ild meet that standard, if yoi ifve got ." (R. 295:228; but see 
R. 295:232-33 (providing instruction that advised jurors for conviction to reconsider if 
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''several of their fellow jurors" did not share in that decision) (emphasis added)). 
The court then gave the parties the option of objecting. (R. 295:228-29). Defense 
counsel objected, maintaining the supplemental instruction "places undue pressure upon a 
single juror," the instruction would be overbearing on that juror's independent conviction, 
and the instruction would result in an unfair trial to Harry where the verdict had been 
tainted by outside influences. (R. 295:230). The trial court overruled the objection (R. 
295:230-31), and called jurors back into the courtroom. It then instructed the jury as 
follows: 
flfl] All right. We're back on the record in the matter of the State of Utah 
vs. Russell David Harry, Case No. 051908113. I want to note for the record that 
all Counsel are present, as is Mr. Harry. Members of the jury, I'm going to ask 
that you continue your deliberations in an effort to agree upon a verdict and 
dispose of this case. I have a few additional comments I would like for you to 
consider as you do so. 
[%2] This is an important case. The trial has been expensive in time, effort 
and money to both the defense and the prosecution. If you should fail to agree on 
a verdict, the case is left open and must be tried again. Obviously another trial 
would only serve to increase the costs to both sides; and there is no reason to 
believe that the case can be tried again by either side better or more exhaustively 
than it has been tried before you. 
[%3] Any future jury must be selected in the same manner and from the 
same source as you were chosen; and there is no reason to believe that the case 
could ever be submitted to eight men and women more conscientious, more 
impartial, or more competent to decide it; . . . or that more or clearer evidence 
could be produced on behalf of either side. 
[%4] In order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result, you must examine 
the questions submitted to you with candor and frankness and with proper 
deference to and regard for the opinions of each other. That is to say in conferring 
together, each of you should pay due attention and respect to the views of the 
others, and listen to each other's arguments with the disposition to re-examine your 
own views. 
[f 5] If a substantial majority of your number are for a conviction, each 
dissenting juror ought to consider whether a doubt in his or her own mind is a 
reasonable one, since it appears to make no effective impression upon the minds of 
so many equally conscientious fellow jurors, who bear the same responsibility, 
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serve under the same oath, and have heard the same evidence, with, we may 
assume, the same attention and equal desire to arrive at the truth. 
[%6] On the other hand, if a majority or even a lesser number of you are for 
acquittal, the other jurors ought to seriously ask themselves again, and most 
thoughtfully, whether they do not have a reason to doubt the correction of a 
judgment, which is not shared by several of their fellow jurors, and whether they 
should distrust the weight and sufficiency of evidence which fails to convince 
several of their fellow jurors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
fl[7] You are not partisans. You are judges; judges of the facts. Your sole 
interest here is to seek the truth from the evidence in the case. Remember at all 
times that no juror is expected to yield a conscientious conviction he or she may 
have as to the weight or effect of the evidence; but remember also that after full 
deliberation and consideration of the evidence in the case, it is your duty to agree 
upon a verdict if you can do so without surrendering your conscientious 
conviction. 
[%S] You must also remember that if the evidence in the case fails to 
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused should have your 
unanimous verdict of not guilty. In order to make a decision more practicable m 
all cases imposes the burden of proof on one party or the other. In this case the 
burden of proof is on the State. You may be as leisurely in your deliberations as 
the occasion may require, and should take all the time which you may feci is 
necessary, including recessing until tomorrow 
ffi9] I will ask now that you retire once again, and continue your 
deliberations with these additional comments in mind to be applied in conjunction 
with all of the instructions I have previously given to you. Members of the jury, I 
will have this instruction copied and sent in shortly. All rise. 
(R. 295:231-33).! Those portions of the transcript containing the supplemental instruc-
1
 The trial court apparently sill m ill h <l i Mild n topy ul the Allen charge to the jury. 
(See R. 295:233). However, it did not include a copy of that written instruction in the 
pleadings file for the record on appeal. (See record in general); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 
19 (2007) (requiring that instructions be in writing); Utah R. App. P. 11 (d)(1) (stating 
that all papers in a criminal case shall be included in the record on appeal). Counsel for 
Harry has endeavored to locate the written instruction given to the jury, but to no avail. 
Since the trial court read the supplemental instruction into the record verbatim, that mav 
be sufficient for a complete record. (See R. 295:231-33). 
In the event this Court or the state is not satisfied that the record of jury 
instructions is complete, this matter should be remanded to the trial court for 
supplementation with additional materials or clarification on the instructions. See_ Utah 
R. App. P. 11(h); State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, %21, 44 P.3d 690 (stating that an appellant 
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tion are attached hereto as Addendum C. The jury again retired to deliberate and returned 
to the courtroom within twenty-six minutes with guilty verdicts on both counts. (R. 204). 
1. The Supplemental Instruction Was Coercive Per Se. 
In Lactod, this Court ruled it will assess whether a verdict-urging charge to a dead-
locked jury is coercive per se. See Lactgd, 761 P.2d at 30. "[I]nherently coercive ideas" 
include an instruction that states"[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case," or that a 
criminal case must be decided at some time. Id_ at 31 (cites omitted). A verdict-urging 
instruction "should not overemphasize the importance of an agreement, suggest that any 
juror surrender his independent judgment, or say or do anything from which the jury 
could possibly infer that the court is indicating anxiety for or demanding some verdict, or 
subjecting the jury to the hardships of long deliberations." IcL (citation omitted). 
Furthermore, instructions that bear resemblance to the Allen instruction are widely 
criticized. Seee.z.* Brown, 853 P.2d at 861; Medina, 738 P.2d at 1022 n.l. 
On the other hand, a court may "appropriately admonish" a jury to deliberate "in 
an atmosphere of mutual deference and respect giving due consideration to the views of 
others in the knowledge that in the end their verdict must reflect the composite views of 
all." Lactod, 761 P.2d at 30. That admonition may be counterbalanced with language to 
jury members "to not give up their conscientiously held opinions." IcL Also, the 
instruction may "remind the jurors of the presumption of defendant's innocence and the 
burden of proof imposed upon the state." IcL at 31 (internal cites omitted). 
may have the record rectified or clarified even after it has been transmitted to the 
appellate court). 
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In this case, the verdict-urging supplemental instruction was similar to variations 
on the Allen instruction that have been d \iu :„e J ur rejectc a o\ uinu* coin . 
supplement --•-: -. '";!•;
 S-:M\V:VO nerse in several respects. 
77ze Instruction Was Coercive and Overemphasized the Importance of Agreement 
The supplemental charge here repeatedly emphasized agreeinci.L .t..-.r .up ^c i : ; ,; -.. 
pressure ^- •• - s^ r.rr~ -res were express and subtle. (See, e.g., R. 295:231-33). 
Specifically, the charge emphasized agreement by advising jurors to "continue 
your deliberations in an effort to agree upon a verdict and dispose ol this case HJI ], it 
staled •>•-.•,- ••'  ^ r>n ""'v-i :^lirve that jurors could not reach a verdict fl[3]; it advised 
jurors that if they failed to reach agreement, "the case is left open and must be tried 
again" [Sj2|, n discussed bringing "cigiu minus to a unanimous rest, : 
.w-M ; u : d , i ' i i ! i - u a r r e r ."!••, \ ^ - r - i , Lrv -.\~uld do so fl[71: it expressed that a more 
conscientious jury could not be empaf ; and it encouraged jurors in the minority 
or near minority to reconsider their position m A&A O; me numerical J; \ i-tun an;. a i•. fact 
;iuu M:u;rai , \ i v r j i ^ ^ •" nrrCpH o r ,;;,! »• : .-i... • .n view [f^[5. '>]. Ml. 295:231-33). 
Those statements expressed the desirability of agreement, as opposed to the duty of each 
individual juror to decide the case ioi Sunihcii and without surrendering n\s con.-- icntious 
judgmnir " r. 
In addition, while the supplemental instruction here contained general principles 
applicable to voting one's conscience, it also inviuaea remarks calculated to impress upoi i 
jni*)i . .:; '.av-ij.-uv . - Ur>^ .. *• ' . . f in i shed jurors 
in the minority to reconsider their position. (See R. 295:232-33 (stating jurors should 
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examine questions and confer with attention, candor, frankness, respect, and deference to 
and regard for each other, and they should listen to each other and re-examine their own 
views fl[4]; stating also that jurors in the minority or near minority should reconsider 
their position where others disagree [%%59 6]); R. 295:233 (advising jurors that while they 
are not expected to surrender their conscientious conviction, their duty is to agree if they 
can fl[7])); see also Kersey, 525 S.W.2d at 144 (stating f,there is an inherent inconsistency 
in these charges in that the dissenters are urged to reconsider their verdict and 
simultaneously are reminded to make their decisions based upon their own convictions 
which they are cautioned not to sacrifice,?). 
The instruction used various methods to exalt agreement over the individual 
opinion and conviction of each juror. That was improper. See. Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31 
(stating an instruction should not overemphasize the importance of agreement). A 
defendant is entitled to the individual judgment of each juror. See State v. Shaw, 59 Utah 
536, 205 P. 339, 340 (1922) (recognizing that while each juror should confer with others 
and listen to what they have to urge in weighing evidence, "each juror must be convin-
ced of the guilt of the defendant before uniting in a verdict against him") (cite omitted). 
Also, the instruction emphasized the expense of trial in terms of time, effort and 
money fl[2]; and advised jurors that if they failed to agree on a verdict, the case would 
have to be retried resulting in an increase in expenses [f 2]. (See R. 295:231-32). That 
language was "irrelevant to the issue of defendants guilt or innocence, and hence 
similarly impermissible." Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1006 & n.16; see also Lactod, 761 P.2d at 
31 (citing favorably to Gainer). 
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Moreover, it was meant to pressure jurors in reaching a verdict. As the court in 
Czachor stated, such language in a supplemental instruction "exerts pressures upon jurors 
impasse. It does so through various references to such matters as the expense and waste 
of a mistrial, the need for a retrial, and the cost and inconvenience of a new trial. I he 
C h a r g e r : ^ : V r • ^ • ; - •' *- l i . ' v . 1 i ^ - - i * • , . - . . - • t i . i c j p a ^ 1 : ^ r 
conscientiously since another similar jury will be called upon in a new trial to perform 
the identical task and presumably will achieve it, i.e., reach a unanimous verdict on the 
sain.- evidence." See Czacl;oi\ - ' ' % • ;%. 
The emphasis on agreement in the supplemental instruction was improper and 
coercive. See Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31 (stating the instruction "shou!d not overemphasize 
• 'w, i.,i „e x»i\. J *;;r. • . - iiKi;' .»-:;4v.. i\r or demanding a 
verdict) (citing £/afe v. Thomas, 86 Ariz, lol , 342 P.2d 197, 200 (1959)). Thus, the 
supplemental instruction here should be rejected. 
The Instruction Contained Improper InforhiaUvti . / p \ •v-n ^ n . . • • 
inteijected irrelevant information into deliberations. Specifically, it stated that if jurors 
failed to agree, the case would have to be tried again. (R. 295:231-33 (stating the case 
mis neeii Lwpeiib' * :,* :,/ .. . • . \ ,;_.\i " , ' 
increasing the costs to both sides [%2]). That admonition was an incorrect statement of 
the law. See Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1006; Martin, 211 N.W.2d at 769 (stating such 
language in a supplemental ..wMiu^ u
 ( . :V..-K-). 
Criminal cases are routinely resolved without trial or without going to trial again. 
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See, e.g.. Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1006 (stating it is "simply not true" that a criminal case 
must be decided at some time: "a hung jury is an inevitable by-product" of unanimity 
requirement); Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31 (recognizing that it is a misstatement of law that a 
criminal case must be decided at some time); State v. Fajardo, 699 P.2d 20, 24 (Hawaii 
1985) (stating that retrial is not a factor that a jury should consider in deliberations); see 
also Utah R. Crim. P. 17(m) (2007) (stating that when the case is submitted to the jury, it 
shall be kept together in deliberations "until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged" 
unless otherwise ordered by the court) (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, while a verdict must be unanimous (see Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-
5(3)(a) (2002); Utah Const, art. I, § 10), a jury is not required to reach a verdict. See, 
e.g., Fioravanti, All F.2d at 416 (recognizing "three possible" decisions in criminal 
cases: (1) not guilty verdict; (2) guilty verdict; (3) no verdict due to lack of unanimity). 
The court interjected incorrect and irrelevant information in an effort to coerce the jury 
into a verdict. 
In addition, jurors were advised to consider the numerical split in deliberations. 
(R. 295:232-33 (advising jurors in the minority for acquittal to consider whether their 
doubt was reasonable given that others were not so impressed [f 5]; and advising jurors in 
the minority or near minority for conviction to reconsider, since their view was not 
shared by "several" fellow jurors ft[6])). Yet the numerical split is not a proper matter for 
deliberations. See_ Fajardo, 699 P.2d at 25 (stating numerical split "has no bearing on the 
reasonableness of a juror's position"; it was "error for a trial court to encourage jurors to 
consider such a factor" in deliberations). Indeed, a jury's verdict should reflect a decision 
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based on the law and the evidence, not on statistics in the jury room. See Martin, 211 
N.W.2d at 771 (criticizing the Allen charge where it departs from asking the jury to base 
Gallup Poll conducted in the deliberation room") (cite omitted). 
Where the supplemental instruction contained improper information, it shuuiu be 
rejected. See Gainer. *^*' ' ' * . • • » ' . ' f -cognizing '• '. • • : ' -d a^- • •••; 
of the expense and inconvenience of retrial). 
7/z Presenting the Instruction, the Court Commented on the Evidence. Utah law 
1
 :i trial \vi<\^ !'•.*. ,v • ^^ *• i Vnr«>. Sa I aa; '•• 1<)M"M ">'VM"'i 
In this case, the court advised jurors that there was no reason to believe more 
evidence or "clearer evidence" could be presented in the mattei p ,3 f . < K. 1V3:23~). ^ 
resolution should be straightforward. See Lewis, 424 N.E.2d at 110 (stating that language 
in supplemental instruction advising jurors that "[t]here is no reason to believe that the 
C a s e c a i i UL' ti M.-'vi i i j . ; . i : ; : a : : ; \ ; I u Y < : ' •• . • . i - I i ^ O - - '
 t - ~ V - •" " ' ' * ! -V-* ; -
no reason to believe that more evidence or clearer evidence would be produced on behalf 
of either side," approaches commenting on the evidence). 
295:232-33). It stated that jurors in favor of conviction ought to consider whether they 
should distrust the sufficiency of evidence. (Id.) Thus, even as the court asked jurors to 
reconsider ineir ina;\ijuai .:'jjibii::iL- -nc^sage a .1 .• - ickave 
was siifficient. That was confusing as well as inappropriate. See Nicholson, 315 So.2d 
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at 642; see also Fioravanti, All F.2d at 411 (Allen charge, with direction that jurors 
should distrust their own judgment if they find others taking different view, is an 
unwarranted judicial invasion of the exclusive province of the jury). The supplemental 
instruction was improper and should be rejected. 
The Instruction Targeted the Juror in the Minority and Suggested that She 
Surrender Her Independent Judgment; It Was Unbalanced and Intimidating. The 
supplemental instruction as a whole was unfair and intimidating. It targeted the juror in 
the minority, suggesting that she surrender her independent judgment. (See R. 295:231-
33, flfl[5,6]); see also Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31 (stating that a supplemental instruction 
should not suggest that any juror surrender his or her independent judgment). 
Specifically, the instruction admonished a juror in the minority for acquittal to 
reconsider whether her doubt was reasonable since it made "no effective impression" 
upon "so many equally conscientious fellow" jurors for conviction fl[5]. (R. 295:232). In 
addition, the instruction stated that jurors in the minority (or near minority) favoring 
conviction should seriously ask whether they do not have reason to doubt their judgment 
or to distrust sufficient evidence where "several of their fellow jurors" were not 
convinced of reasonable doubt [%6]. (R. 295:232-33). 
The instruction served to admonish jurors in the minority for acquittal, and jurors 
in the minority (or near minority) for conviction to reconsider their position in light of the 
majority view. (R. 295:232-33). Significantly, the instruction did not ask the same of 
jurors in the clear majority. (R.295:231-33). That was unfair. See Randalj 353 P.2d at 
1058 (criticizing the Allen charge where the "inevitable effect" was that it suggested to 
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"minority members of the jury that they ought to surrender their own convictions and 
follow the majority"); see also Martin, 211 N.W.2d at 769. 
Inaddr* " '< •-. *.r, ^at"-1 i'i "• '^'^•"•••^ •• ' ' ' I ' 1 - 1 •••• v . s .. >r 
acquittal ought to reconsider her view. It stated that where a "substantial majority" of 
jurors are for conviction, a juror for acquittal "ought to consider'"1 whether her position 
M,h i^i^uiiaule gi- • : - " .*n>.^i - • w
 N: * -V> <•. :.-uJq 0 f -;o T v . n y 
equally conscientious fellow jurors, who bear the same responsibility, serve under the 
same oath, and have heard the same evidence," with "the same attention and equal desire 
to an -\v; ai ,•" t: - :2.V • : ' ' " x n ) i J ' ! - j ^ ;*- -' *s>?-*^u if ^ • • • ' . . i ' o i i l l 
favored responsible, attentive jurors seeking truth: that is, the "substantial majority" for 
conviction. 
. . . . - • Mi]'|i!'' :i^  ••ia: :n.^ i* ;\ :• -•• .- .*••<! ;«n.H .Nipfusing 
language in admonishing jurors for conviction to reconsider. (R. 295:232-33). The 
language in Harry's case was similar to language that the court criticized in Nicholson. 
There, I;I-J 11^ 1*111^ . .luhRMnhnu- .:• . .. - :;tv -'^ ---v-i "••"• i, 
minority should consider whether their doubts are reasonable, since they make no 
effective impression upon the minds of ['. . .]so many equally honest, equally intelligent 
fellow jurors. [ ']" Nicholson, J> \ • o J d - i M i i »i HI • i j i s l n u / i i n o j u l i n n n i ^ l i r i l i lmt 
"if a maioritv or a lesser number favor acquittal, the other jurors should ask themselves 
whether they do not have reason to doubt the correctness of a judgment not concurred in 
[' | by many of their fellow jurors. mr, {sec tu$u v . ; o.J :;._ 33 i. 
The Nicholson c< VM ihnt the above language was untenable for two reasons: 
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First, it "virtually insures jury confusion." Nicholson, 315 So.2d at 642. "[I]t urges those 
favoring conviction or acquittal to discount their views if they are in the minority or in a 
bare majority." IcL The language made the instruction "difficult to comprehend"; it was 
an "invitation to a frolic with Alice in Wonderland." IcL (cite omitted). 
Second, the instruction framed the charge "in such a way as to encourage majority 
consideration of minority views only when the minority view is held [f. . J by many of 
their fellow jurors[, ...']" IcL (emphasis added). Thus, the instruction "urge[d] con-
formity with majority (or near majority) views," and discredited minority views "if the 
minority is less than substantial." Id In that regard, the instruction had the potential to 
coerce a juror to change his/her position because s/he was in the minority. IcL 
In Harry's case, the admonition advising jurors to reconsider their position was 
directed at the minority view - or, in the case of jurors in favor of conviction, a near 
minority view. (R. 295:232-33 (stating that jurors in the minority for acquittal ought to 
reconsider their position where "so many" others disagreed [%5]\ also stating that jurors in 
the minority or near minority for conviction, ought to reconsider their position, where 
"several of their fellow jurors" disagreed [%6]) (emphasis added)). 
It did not admonish the clear majority to reconsider in light of opposing views. 
(See R. 295:231-33). Yet in this case, the jury split reflected a clear majority and a sole 
dissenting juror. (R. 295:227). Thus, the instruction had the effect of pressuring a single 
juror in the minority to reconsider without imposing the same obligation on others. Also, 
the admonition to reconsider spoke in the plainest terms to a sole holdout for acquittal. 
(R. 295:232). Such language would have an impact on a single dissenting juror. 
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The instruction here was improper. "Indeed, there is considerable merit to the 
contention that the majority of a jury is not always right and that the possibility of a hung 
Marsh, 490 P.2d at 503. "A vibrant, pulsating, intelligent minority is a part of our 
American way of life. The views of the minority often, with the passage of time, become 
themajoriL) ^cw UM^idniva! . / \ ! i / n i u i u n . \ .L.pi " • iv any 
given subject is not always the correct view." RandalL 353 P.2d at 1058. "A 
conscientious minority is the backbone of our American way of life. No individual, group 
or institution, howe *J> a.i. . .k LI-, IMICUI. i:i^.iM«;- J v s*".. — " .^^ivicii* • 
nin^ritv io conform to that of the majority for the expedience of rendering a unanimous 
decision." Fajardo, 699 P.2d at 25. 
I he instruction m ::^::y s case acpuucu ;: • • n; IC^IUHMIL- p pv^c r; .: •• : . 
• .) :"-cld^ -. verdict based on the evidence and the law, and substituted a direction 
that the jury should be influenced by the numbers in the majority. The instruction 
invaded the province ol tii-.. jury. See Garza, ....^  .: . _ dinnc/i-i., t. 
s .». \\<- '* - * ' TC of the :\\v •*- i deprived defendant of fair and impartial 
trial). It should be disavowed as coercive per se. 
2. Un XJLSJ I i "' ' ih/ lie Stricken. 
S'"- -^ "*l "irl< •*- -u , v ^ v- 4V i//(7/-type charge was unduly coercive "under the 
specific circumstances of the case " I ac foci, 761 P.2d at 30. 
The Instruction as a Whole Was Coercive; it Placed Pressure on a Single Juror. 
.\ > M.uvd ,: ' ,v> '- * ! * : * " seeLactod, ^ ^ } v V was coercive. 
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See supra. Argument B.I., herein. Indeed, the supplemental instruction served only one 
purpose: to coerce jurors into a verdict. 
To explain, the record here shows that prior to deliberations, the trial court advised 
jurors, among other things, to help each other arrive at the truth; to use their memories, 
understanding, and common sense; to respect each others' opinions; and to "change your 
mind" in deliberations if "[you are] persuaded that a decision you initially made was 
wrong." (R. 295:179; 222). The court instructed jurors to not make a decision just to 
agree with others. (Id.) "[Y]our verdict must be your own." (Id.) It instructed jurors 
that a verdict would have to be unanimous (R. 223); presumptions of law favored 
innocence (id.); and the prosecution had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt (R. 223; 224). The pre-deliberation instructions are attached as Addendum D. 
The trial court's pre-deliberation instructions reflected the unanimity requirement 
and expressed respect for the individual judgment of each juror without invading the 
province of the jury and without being threatening. (See Addendum D). The instructions 
were not intimidating or unbalanced; they did not pressure or coerce a juror who may be 
in the dissent; they did not place undue emphasis on agreement. Brown, 853 P.2d at 861 
(stating where the instruction was "given prior to jury deliberations," the danger that such 
an instruction will coerce jurors, who have reached an impasse, "is dissipated, if not 
lost"); Lactod, 761 P.2d at 29 & n.3 (recognizing ABA standards which suggest giving 
instruction before deliberations and repeating, where appropriate, during deliberations). 
After the trial court read all the instructions, jurors deliberated. (R. 203-04). They 
asked the court questions and requested the opportunity to view additional evidence that 
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was not presented at trial. (R. 265) . The court denied those requests . (Id.) Thereafter, 
jurors reported deadlock. (?cc R. 265). They stated, "we have come to a unanimous 
(i<v*jo m - " ' ' . . . * \/V ndt'cit/rd 
and will not change." (Id. (emphasis added)) . 
Significantly, jurors did not request additional instruction and they did not request 
suMiti'.n.-i • " - | i V - - f.Sy" R v ( - n- ^cc also i v i h ' ! r v 
17(11) (2007) (stating if the j u ry desires "to be informed on any point of law arising in the 
cause" after it has retired for deliberations, it snail advise the court and the court may 
advjso -V- ^ - '* •-''••*n. 
Notwithstanding, the trial court brought the j u ry into the cour t room for the 
supplemental instruction. A m o n g other things, it advised the jury to continue 
del irK*r:n ions "in an :: ffc 1 1: t :> agree 11 ip> :)ii a ^ verdict a n d d i spose of t h e c ase " (R 295:231, 
[%\\}. ii talked about br inging eight minds to a unanimous result. (R. 295:232, fl[4]). It 
emphasized the expense of the trial, and the wasted resources if the ju ry failed to agree. 
be "tried again." (Id., fl[2]). It urged jurors in the minori ty favoring acquittal to 
reconsider. (IcL, [ f5]) . And it urged jurors in the minori ty or near minori ty for 
::: :)ii - > ic t ion tc • ask \ .,- 1 ieth* 1 Il 1 " r'" '" |! 11 : 11 1a • - e a 1: eas : 11 to don ibt' ' : 1 a 1 e as> : 1 1 to disti 1 1 st 
sufficient evidence. (Id., [ „« j y . i'tie court admonished jurors that they had a duty to 
agree if they can do so, it indicated that jurors would have to return tomorrow, then it sent 
them to the jury room KM . „.ici UCULV: ,< ,). 
In the context of this case, where the jury specifically did no t request further 
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instruction but rather announced its decision (R. 265), the supplemental instruction was 
improper. It conveyed the notion that by failing to come to an agreement, the jury had 
disappointed the court and acted contrary to earlier instructions. Also, where the jury had 
reported that the deadlocked status "will not change" (R. 265), the supplemental charge 
communicated that it must change: the instruction had the effect of coercing the jury. 
In addition, only one member of the jury was in the dissent (see R. 295:227; 265). 
In the face of that information, the trial court urged a juror in the minority for acquittal to 
reconsider her position since it made "no effective impression" on the minds of the 
"equally conscientious," responsible, attentive jurors seeking truth. (R. 295:232). 
Also, the court urged a juror in the minority or near minority for conviction to 
consider whether he did not have doubt. (R. 295:232-33). Notably, the supplemental 
instruction did not specifically urge jurors in the clear majority to reconsider their 
position. (R. 295:231-33). In that regard, the court placed undue pressure on a single 
juror in the minority. 
While the trial court did not know which particular juror was in the dissent, that is 
irrelevant: fellow jurors knew. The immediate danger of an Allen charge is the pressure it 
places on a dissenting juror. A supplemental instruction urging agreement in the face of 
such a lopsided split would give the majority ammunition to pressure the lone juror into 
joining the others for agreement. That is coercive. See Brown, 853 P.2d at 861 
(recognizing that traditional Allen instructions have been "criticized as tending to 
pressure jurors into giving up their sincere convictions merely because a majority reached 
a different conclusion"; also recognizing that supplemental instructions have "the 
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potential to be coercive, depending on [the] content, if given to jurors who have reached 
an impasse"); Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1005; Marsh, 490 P.2d at 503; see also Lactod, 761 
P.2d at 28 (reflecting an instruction that was not directed to jurors in the minority view). 
Under the circumstances, the supplemental instruction should be rejected. 
The Supplemental Instruction Was Not Reasonably Within ABA Standards. In 
Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31, this Court considered whether the Allen charge at issue "was 
reasonably within the ABA-recommended standards for verdict-urging instructions." IcL 
In this case, the supplemental Allen-type charge did not comply with ABA 
standards. Specifically, the ABA standards rely on cooperation in deliberations and the 
importance that each individual juror decides the case for himself or herself. ABA Stds, 
§ 15-5.4. J 
The ABA standards do not mandate that the jury return a verdict; they do not em-
phasize agreement; they do not discuss wasted resources, the expense of retrying the 
case, or the need for a new trial; they do not urge jurors in the minority to reassess their 
decision in light of the fact that the substantial majority of jurors or several other fellow 
jurors disagree; and they do not make reference to the "sufficiency of evidence." IcL 
Yet the supplemental instruction here discussed those things. (R. 295:231-33). 
Other courts have disavowed language that the trial court used in this case for the 
supplemental instruction. See Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1006 & n.16 (stating that reference to 
expense and inconvenience of retrial is irrelevant and impermissible; also it is "simply 
not true" that a criminal case must be decided at some time; and finding error in an 
instruction that "encourages jurors to consider the numerical division" of the panel as part 
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of deliberations); see also Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31 (citing favorably to Gainer, also, stating 
instruction "should not overemphasize the importance of an agreement"; and stating that 
instruction should not suggest that any juror surrender his independent judgment); Prim, 
289 N.E.2d at 610 (ruling it is incorrect to tell a jury that the case will have to be retried); 
Lewis, 424 N.E.2d at 110 (stating that language in supplemental instruction advising 
jurors that "[tjhere is no reason to believe that the case can be tried again any better or 
more exhaustively than it has been" and " [tjhere is no reason to believe that more 
evidence or clearer evidence would be produced on behalf of either side" approaches 
commenting on the evidence); Nicholson, 315 So.2d at 642 (finding language in the 
instruction to be confusing and geared to the minority or near minority). Where the 
instruction here was not reasonably within the ABA-recommended standards for 
supplemental verdict-urging instructions, it should be rejected. 
The Jury Advised the Trial Court that the Deadlocked Status "Will Not Change." 
In this case, the jury sent questions to the judge indicating concerns about the evidence or 
missing evidence: the jury asked to see a patrol car similar to Garcia's car, and it asked 
about Harry's clothes. (See R. 265). In response, the court advised the jury it had all the 
evidence it would receive in the matter. (Id.) Thereafter, the jury reported deadlock at 
seven to one. (R. 295:227; 265). It also reported that the deadlocked decision "will not 
change." (R. 265). That should have been acceptable to the trial court. See, e.g., Utah R. 
Crim. P. 17(m) (stating jurors shall deliberate until they come to a verdict "or are dis-
charged," unless otherwise ordered by the court); Fields, 487 P.2d at 837 (stating a hung 
jury is a legitimate end to a trial); Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135, 137 (1909) (recog-
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nizing that the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes discharging a jury that cannot agree). 
I 
Instead, the court urged the jury to come to a unanimous verdict. (R. 295:231-33). 
That was improper. Where jurors requested additional evidence during deliberations, then 
reported a division of seven-to-one when it did not receive the evidence, it is unlikely that 
the lone juror changed his/her position because of the evidence. Rather, the most 
reasonable conclusion based on the colloquies is that the juror changed his/her position 
because s/he felt pressure to do so after the trial court gave the supplemental instruction. 
The colloquies between the court and jury support that the jury was coerced into a 
unanimous verdict. The verdict was not based on the non-coerced decision of each juror. 
The Jury Rendered a Verdict in Short Order After Being Admonished to Reach 
Agreement, Thereby Supporting Coercion. After the jury deliberated the case for more 
than three hours, it reported that further deliberations were futile. (R. 265). The court 
then gave the supplemental instruction, and the jury quickly returned with a verdict. (R. 
203-04 (indicating that jurors went back into the jury room, came to a decision, and 
returned to the courtroom with a verdict within twenty-six minutes)); see Lowenfield, 484 
U.S. at 235, 240 (stating jury returned with verdict "in 30 minutes11; where verdict was 
returned "soon after receiving the supplemental instruction," this "suggests the possibility 
of coercion"); see also State v. McNail 161 S.W.2d 84, 86-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) 
(returning verdict within ten minutes after second supplemental verdict-urging 
instruction). The Allen-typo instruction had the effect of blasting the jury into a verdict. 
That supports coercion under the circumstances. 
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3. The Error Here Resulted in a Structural Defect, Requiring Reversal. In the 
Alternative, Harry Has Demonstrated Prejudice; He Is Entitled to a New Trial. 
Courts have ruled that where the trial court gave an improper Allen-type charge, a 
conviction should be reversed and the case should be remanded for a new trial. See 
Gainer, 566 P.2d 997; Nicholson. 315 So.2d 639; Goodmuth, 490 A.2d 682; Martin, 211 
N.W.2d 765; Randall 353 P.2d 1054; Garza, 176 N.W.2d 664. A defect that impacts on 
jury deliberations is structural error. In State v. Czachor, the court stated the following 
We have recognized that errors which impact substantially and directly on 
fundamental procedural safeguards, and particularly upon the sensitive process of jury 
deliberations, are not amenable to harmless error rehabilitation. Their prejudicial 
effect "cannot be readily measured by the empirical or objective assessment of the 
evidence bearing upon defendants guilt." A defendant confronted with this kind of 
trial error need not demonstrate actual prejudice in order to reacquire his right to a fair 
trial. 
Czachor, 413 A.2d at 599 (considering the matter where the trial court repeated an Allen 
charge three times to a deadlocked jury) (citing State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 398 A.2d 861 
(1979); Gainer, 566 P.2d at 997); see also Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31 (citing favorably to 
Gainer)', Lewis, 424 N.E.2d at 110 (stating that when the court brings the jury back and 
emphasizes a particular instruction, the court commits reversible error). 
In the alternative, if this Court determines that an appellant must show prejudice, 
Harry has demonstrated prejudice in this case. According to the record, after more than 
three hours of deliberations, the jury reached a verdict on the misdemeanor count for 
driving under the influence. (See R. 204; 265 (jury note)). However, at least one juror 
had doubt about the strength and validity of the state's case on the possession charge. 
(See R. 265 (jury note regarding deadlock)). 
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Indeed, the state's evidence relating to the drugs was circumstantial. The state had 
destroyed the primary evidence for the charge (see R. 125 (acknowledging that the drugs 
were "inadvertently destroyed11)), and it went to trial relying on chain of custody 
evidence, secondary reports, and comparisons. (See R. 294). The evidence and 
omissions created reasonable doubt. 
According to the state's evidence, after Garcia arrested Harry for failing sobriety 
tests, he searched Harry and placed cuffs on his wrists behind his back (R. 294:34-36, 65-
66, 166). Garcia then placed Harry in a confined space in the back of the patrol car. (R. 
294:36, 71-72). Garcia surmised that while Harry was in that position, he removed 
several bags associated with drugs from his clothing to place in various spots in the patrol 
car. (R. 294:43-44). The jury apparently had doubt about Garcia's claims: it asked to see 
a patrol car and Harry's clothing. (See R. 265). The jury was not allowed to see those 
items. (Id.) 
Garcia also testified that he retrieved three baggies from the back of his patrol car. 
One baggie was tinted blue and the other baggies were clear; at least one baggie 
contained a white crystal substance. (R. 294:43-44). Garcia placed the items in 
evidence. (R. 294:43). He claimed the items belonged to Harry. 
The state later destroyed the baggies. (See R. 125). Thus, Garcia could not demon-
strate their existence. Those facts likely contributed to doubt in the minds of jurors. 
In an effort to make up for lost evidence, the state called Joan Keller, an evidence 
custodian, to describe the chain of custody for the baggies. (R. 294:103, 105). Keller 
testified that she took possession of plastic baggies to secure them for later testing at the 
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crime lab, and she also took custody of the evidence after testing. (See R. 294:103, 105, 
113). Keller described the evidence only as sealed baggies of white crystal substance. 
(R. 294:114-115). She stated that if the evidence had a unique characteristic, she would 
have noted it. (R. 294:115). She did not note blue tinting. (See R. 294:110, 114, 115). 
Likewise, Ted Bararnik, the individual who took possession of the evidence for 
the Salt Lake lab, and Ryan Barney, a criminalist who tested the substances, did not note 
any unique characteristics. (SeeR. 294:119, 121, 122, 123; 294:125, 129-32). 
In short, according to the state's witnesses, Garcia searched Harry and found 
nothing (R. 294:59, 65-66, 68), Garcia searched Harry's car and found nothing indicative 
of drugs (R. 294:60, 70), Garcia handled drugs that he found in the patrol car (R. 294:43-
44, 157), the state destroyed the primary drug evidence in this case (R. 125), and state 
witnesses gave different descriptions of the baggies containing a substance that tested 
positive for methamphetamine. (See R. 294:43-44, 114-15, 119-23). Those facts support 
reasonable doubt. 
In addition, Harry testified that he did not possess the drugs. He stated that Garcia 
searched him thoroughly (R. 294:156), then placed him in the back of a patrol car with 
his hands cuffed behind his back. (R. 294:156, 157). He was uncomfortable and moved 
around to readjust the pressure of the cuffs on his wrists. (R. 294:157). When Garcia 
came to check on him, Garcia showed Harry three baggies. (R. 294:157). Harry did not 
recognize the baggies and he denied that they were his. (R. 294:157, 158). 
According to the record, the jury deliberated the case and even requested 
additional evidence. (R. 265). After three hours and twenty-four minutes (R. 204), the 
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jury remained deadlocked seven-to-one on the felony count for drug possession; also, the 
jury believed that status would ffnot change." (R. 295:227; 265). 
Notwithstanding, the trial court gave the supplemental Allen-type charge. (R. 295: 
231-33). Notably, the court maintained that if it did not give the supplemental 
instruction, it would declare a mistrial. (R. 295:228). The prosecutor did not dispute that 
assessment. (See id.) Within twenty-six minutes of instructing the jury on the Allen 
charge, the jurors reported a verdict on the felony count. (R. 203-04). 
Where the jury did not anticipate that its deadlocked status would change (see R. 
265), it is reasonable to conclude that it changed only because the trial court pressured the 
jury into a verdict. (See R. 295:231-33); see also supra. Arguments B. 1. and B.2., herein. 
That supports prejudice. Also, there is a reasonable likelihood that if the court had not 
given the Allen-type instruction, the jury would have remained deadlocked. (See R. 265 
(stating the deadlock "will not change")). That is acceptable under the law. 
i 
A deadlocked jury is "an inevitable by-product of our unanimous verdict 
requirement." Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1006. If deadlock occurs, an inconclusive judgment 
"may well stand as the final word on the issue of defendant's guilt." IcL In addition, it 
provides the prosecutor with the opportunity to review the strength of his case and assess 
other resolutions in the matter. See, e.g., id.; Martin, 211 N.W.2d at 770. 
In the event this Court finds that the trial court erred in giving the supplemental 
Allen charge here, Harry respectfully requests that it return the parties to that point 
wherein the trial court should have declared a mistrial for a deadlocked jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Harry respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the conviction for felony possession and remand the case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this Jnd day of ft 0\f ember 2007. 
Linda M. Jones n 
Brenda Viera 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Linda M. Jones, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered an 
original and 7 copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State 
Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and 4 copies to the Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this ^?n J day of fip \}ew\ h-er ,2007. 
LINDA M.JONES / 
DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah Court of 
Appeals as indicated above this day of Alc^g-mff^r , 2007. 
48 
Tab A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
RUSSELL DAVID HARRY, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051908113 FS 
Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
Date: December 15, 2006 
PRESENT 
Clerk: wendypg 
Prosecutor: NELSON, STEPHEN L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): VIERA, BRENDA M 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 9, 1971 
Video 
Tape Count: 12-10-3 8 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/12/2006 Guilty 
2. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/12/2006 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Page 1 
Case No: 051908113 
Date: Dec 15, 2006 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 180 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 180 
day(s). 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Court orders both counts run Concurrent. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 
Charge # 2 
Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
Fine 
Suspended 
Due 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$5000.00 
$3705.00 
$608.51 
$1295.00 
$1000.00 
$1000.00 
$0.00 
$6000.00 
$4705.00 
$608.51 
$1295.00 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
Fines/fees to be supervised by AP&P 
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Case No: 051908113 
Date: Dec 15, 2006 
ORDER OF PROBATION
 ( 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1295.00 which includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
No Further Violations 
Report directly to AP&P on next business day 
Credit 3 days jail previously served. 
Pay a fine of $1295.00 as a condition of probation. 
Complete a mental health evaluation and follow through with 
recommendations. 
Complete a substance abuse evaluation and follow through with 
recommendations. 
Do not possess or consume any alcohol, or frequent places where 
alcohol is chief item of order. 
50 Hours community service. 
Maintain full time employment. 
ZERO TOLERANCE 
No further violations. 
Dated this /$?** day of Z ^ L ^ < ^ 
Page 3 (last) 
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Utah Constitution Article I, § 12 (Supp. 2007) 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 'compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in par t at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Ar t . I, § 12 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1994, S.J.R. 6, approved by the voters on November 8, 1994, 
§ \" and took effect on January 1,1995. The amend-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- ment added the second paragraph 
ment was proposed by Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 17 (2007) 
Rule 17. The trial, 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(a)(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may 
consent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause 
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(b)(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(b)(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(b)(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(b)(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury 
in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
Rule 17 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 436 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
writ ten demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. 
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified 
in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the 
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writ ing or made orally 
in open court, proceed to tr ial or complete a trial then in progress with any 
number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in 
the following order: 
(g)(lj The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(g)(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening s ta tement and the 
defense may make an opening s ta tement or reserve it unti l the prosecution has 
rested; 
(g)(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(g)(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(g)(5) Thereafter, the part ies may offer only rebutting evidence unless the 
court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, 
the court shall instruct the jury; and 
(g)(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both 
sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument , the defense 
shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense 
argument. The court may set reasonable limits upon the a rgument of counsel 
for each party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an 
al ternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the al ternate 
juror. If no al ternate has been selected, the parties may st ipulate to proceed 
with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged 
and a new trial ordered. 
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit wri t ten ques-
tions to a witness as provided in this section. 
(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control 
the process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impart ia l finder of fact 
and does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any 
question from a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time. 
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should 
advise the jurors tha t they may write the question as it occurs to them and 
submit the question to the bailiff for t ransmit ta l to the judge. The judge should 
advise the jurors tha t some questions might not be allowed. 
(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented 
part ies and rule upon any objection to the question. The judge may disallow a 
question even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the 
wri t ten question in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask 
the question or permit counsel or an unrepresented par ty to ask it. The 
question may be rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel and 
unrepresented parties to examine the witness after the juror 's question. 
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the ju ry to view the place 
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for tha t purpose. The officer shall be sworn tha t while 
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other t han the person so 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with 
the trial and to re turn them into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time. 
437 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 17 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate 
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(1) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instruc-
tions of the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, except 
exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the 
jury, such as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall 
permit the jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take notes 
during the trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As 
necessary, the court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct 
the jury on taking and using notes. 
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept 
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree 
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except 
by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow 
any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask 
them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict 
is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the 
verdict agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed 
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge 
of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the 
jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and 
the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be 
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out 
again. 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion 
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2002.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph 
(1). The committee recommends amending 
paragraph (\) to establish the right of jurors to 
take notes and to have those notes with them 
during deliberations. The committee recom-
mends removing depositions from the para-
graph not in order to permit the jurors to have 
depositions but to recognize that depositions 
are not evidence. Depositions read into evi-
dence will be treated as any other oral testi-
mony These amendments and similar amend-
ments to the Rules of Civil Procedure will make 
the two provisions identical. 
Cross-References. — Capital felony, pen-
alty execution of penalty, §§ 76-3-206, 76-3-207, 
77-19-1 et seq. 
Fees, payment by state in criminal cases, § 
78-46-38. 
Husband and wife as witness for or against 
each other, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec 12, §§ 
77-1-6, 78-24-8. 
Jurors and jury § 78-46-1 et seq 
R,eport of testimony of witness taken at pre-
liminary examination as admissible, Rule 7. 
Right to jurv trial, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 
10; § 77-1-6. 
When judgment rendered, Rule 22. 
When verdict rendered, Rule 21. 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury, § 15-5.4 (3d ed. 1996) 
Standard 15-5.4. Length of deliberations; deadlocked 
jury 
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give 
an instruction which informs the jury: 
(1) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree 
thereto; 
(2) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to 
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be 
done without violence to individual judgment; 
(3) that each juror must decide the case for himself or herself 
but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with 
the other jurors; 
(4) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hes-
itate to reexamine his or her own views and change an opinion 
if the juror is convinced it is erroneous; and 
(5) that no juror should surrender his or her honest belief as 
to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the 
opinion of the other jurors, or for the mere purpose of rehirning 
a verdict. 
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to 
agree, the court may require the jury to continue uieir deliberations 
and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in section (a). 
The court should not require or threaten to require the jury to 
deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable 
intervals. 
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a 
verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of agree-
ment. 
History of Standard 
This standard has been renumbered and changed in style only. 
Related Standards 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure 523(d), 532 (1987) 
) 
25. Annot, 15 A.L.R. 2d 490 (1951). 
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Commentary 
Jury Charge Relating to Duties 
A court should instruct the jury initially on the nature of its duties 
in the course of deliberations. No particular language need be used, 
but section (a) sets out five points on which a jury might properly be 
advised. 
The following is illustrative of an instruction consistent with Stan-
dard 15-5.4(a): 
The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each 
juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror 
agree thereto. Your verdict must be unanimous. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to 
deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do 
so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must 
decide the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial 
consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the 
course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your 
own views and change your opinion if convinced it is erro-
neous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the 
weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of 
your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a ver-
dict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges—judges of the facts. 
Your sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in 
the case.1 
Because the instruction contemplated in section (a) is to be given 
before the jury has retired and thus before a minority exists, and be-
cause it makes no reference to a minority but instead charges all jurors 
to consult with one another, the proposed instruction does not have 
the coercive impact of the Allen charge.2 
Length of the Deliberations 
A trial judge should be able to send the jury back for further delib-
erations notwithstanding its indication that it has been unable to 
1. Instruction 8.11 of Jury Instructions and Forms for Federal Criminal Cases, 27 
F.R.D. 39, 97-98 (1961). 
2. See Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1966), recommending the 
practice in Standard 15-4.4(a). See also Note, The Allen Charge: Dead Law a Long Time 
Dying, 6 U.S.F. L. REV. 326 (1972). 
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agree. The general view is that a court may send the jury back for 
additional deliberations even though the jury has indicated once, 
twice, or several times that it cannot agree or even after jurors have 
requested that they be discharged.3 Statutes in a few states limit the 
number of times a court can order a disagreeing jury to continue de-
liberations.4 That view has not been adopted in section (b), however, 
as it is believed that a jury should not be permitted to avoid a rea-
sonable period of deliberation merely by repeated indications that it 
is unhappy over its inability to agree. 
A judge should not require a jury to deliberate for an unreasonable 
length of time or for unreasonable intervals, or threaten a jury with 
the prospect of such unreasonably lengthy deliberations. The length 
of time a jury may be kept deliberating is a matter within the discre-
tion of the trial judge; abuse of that discretion requires reversal. The 
reasonableness of the deliberation period should not be fixed by an 
arbitrary period of time, but should depend upon such factors as: the 
length of the trial; the nature or complexity of the case; the volume 
and nature of the evidence; the presence of multiple counts or multiple 
defendants; and the jurors' statements to the court concerning the 
probability of agreement.5 
No coercion exists simply because a court has required jurors to 
deliberate a reasonable length of time. The reasonableness of allegedly 
prolonged jury deliberations has been upheld in these situations: (1) 
nineteen hours of deliberation after a four-week trial;6 (2) deliberations 
ordered to continue after four hours during which time the jury twice 
reported its inability to agree;7 and (3) four days of deliberation after 
forty-four days of trial.8 
The conditions under which a jury is forced to deliberate, rather 
than the total length of time it deliberates, is often the key factor in 
assessing reasonableness. Thus, in one case, a court reversed a defen-
dant's conviction following a verdict returned after the jury had been 
3. Annot., 93 A.L.R. 2d 627, 639 (1964); DeVault v. United States, 338 F.2d 179 (10th 
Cir. 1964); People v. Boyden, 181 Cal. App. 2d 48, 4 Cai. Rptr. 869 (1960), cert, denied, 
365 U.S. 650 (1961). 
4. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 14-7-1330 (1976). 
5. Annot., 93 A.L.R. 2d 627 (1964). 
6. United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d 154 (3d Cir.), cert granted, 385 U.S. 810 (1966). 
7. Minkow v. United States, 5 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1925). 
8. People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955). 
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required to deliberate twenty-seven hours without sleep 9 In another 
case, a court reversed a conviction following a verdict returned at 5 25 
A M after the jurors had displayed impatience, fatigue, and confusion 
but had been ordered to contmue deliberations after ten and a half 
hours 10 Similarly, it has been held to be an abuse of discretion to 
threaten to keep a jury together for an unreasonable period of time, 
as where, for example, a judge told jurors that they would be kept 
together for four days unless they agreed sooner n It is also clear that 
a trial judge may not tell disagreeing jurors that they will be kept 
together indefinitely or until they agree upon a verdictu 
Section (b) does not, however, recommend an absolute bar on a trial 
judge telling a jury how much longer it will be required to deliberate 
There is a split of authority on the question of whether such action is 
proper 13 The argument against permitting such a communication is 
that minority jurors may surrender to the majority simply to avoid 
having to remain the announced time or that a contrary or disagree-
able juror may be encouraged to "stick it out" to the indicated dead-
line u However, if the time announced is not unduly long, these do 
not seem to be great risks15 
The Allen Charge 
The issue of how to instruct a jury which has reported itself dead-
locked has had a long and somewhat controversial history That his-
tory began with Allen v United States,16 a decision in which the Su-
preme Court approved a strong, compelling instruction to a 
deadlocked jury This history was also affected, m no small part, by 
the ABA's adoption of Standard 15-4 4 m 1968 This standard rejected 
9 State v Green, 254 Iowa 1379, 121 N W 2d 89 (1963) 
10 Commonwealth v Clark, 404 Pa 143, 170 A 2d 847 (1961) 
11 Burnam v Commonwealth, 283 Ky 361, 141 S W 2d 282 (1940) 
12 Boyett v United States, 48 F 2d 482 (5th Cir 1931), State v Rodman, 208 La 523, 
23 So 2d 204 (1945), Character v State, 212 Miss 30, 53 So 2d 41 (1951) 
13 Compare Wishardv State,5 0kla Crim 610,115 P 796 (1911) with Butler v State, 
185 Tenn 686, 207 S W 2d 584 (1948) 
14 Wade v State 155 Miss 648,124 So 803 (1929) 
15 See, e g, Butler v State, 185 Tenn 686, 207 S W 2d 584 (1948), in which the court 
told the jury that it would Let them consider the case a little longer but that it did not 
want to keep them overnight 
16 164 US 492(1896) 
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the historically-accepted Allen charge as being too coercive on minor-
ity jurors, and proposed a substitute, less coercive instruction. 
In 1896, the Supreme Court decided Allen v. United States,17 approv-
ing what has come to be known as the "Allen charge" or the "dyna-
mite charge/ ' In Allen, a criminal defendant had been convicted of 
murder arid sentenced to death. The defendant appealed the convic-
tion on eighteen separate grounds, one of which was the court's in-
structions to the jury. After the instructions at the close of the case, 
the jury began its deliberations. After some time, the jurors returned 
to the courtroom, reporting that they were unable to arrive at a unan-
imous verdict and requesting additional instructions from the judge.18 
The judge instructed the jury, in substance, 
that in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not 
be expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of 
each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the con-
clusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question 
submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference 
to the opinions of each other; that it was their duty to decide 
the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should 
listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's ar-
guments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, 
a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a 
reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of 
so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. 
If, upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the mi-
nority ought to ask themselves whether they might not rea-
sonably doubt the correctness of a judgement which was not 
concurred in by the majority.19 
The Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, and specifically ap-
proved the charge given to the jury in order to break the deadlock.20 
The Allen decision was generally followed until publication of Stan-
dard 15-4.4 in 1968. Since that time, the clear trend has been for var-
ious jurisdictions to substitute the less coercive charge recommended 
by these standards for the more coercive Allen charge.21 The primary 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 501. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 501, 502. 
21. Annot, 97 A.L.R. 3d 96 at § 2(a). 
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difference between the ABA standard and the Allen charge is that the 
former does not instruct a juror in the minority to consider, the ma-
jority position in determining how to vote, but instructs all jurors to 
consider the opinions of the others, regardless of which way the vote 
is leaning. 
The decision to provide for an instruction of the sort described in 
section (b) is based upon the opinion that the effect of the Allen charge 
and its variations is unduly coercive and may now be viewed as an 
unconstitutional invasion of the province of the jury. The difficulty 
with the Allen charge is that it does not merely request conscientious 
collective deliberations, but instead is an "unbalanced" charge which 
tends to coerce only the jurors in the minority to reconsider their po-
sitions.22 This standard, less coercive than the Allen charge, is more 
likely to result in an impartial jury verdict. 
It is appropriate, however, for a court to give or repeat to the jury 
an instruction on its responsibilities in the course of deliberations. This 
may be done when the jury has indicated its inability to reach an 
agreement or has deliberated for some time without reaching an 
agreement. 
In the federal system, the various circuits have taken differing po-
sitions on whether or not to accept the Allen charge, the ABA stan-
dard, or some other form of instruction. Only two circuits have re-
tained the pure Allen charge.23 Three circuits have adopted a modified 
form of the Allen charge.24 The Fifth Circuit has adopted a modified 
Allen charge which eliminates the language instructing the majority 
and minority jurors to consider their majority and minority status in 
22. The Allen charge directed that "a dissenting juror should consider whether his 
doubt was a reasonable one . . . " and "the minority ought to ask themselves whether 
they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment . . . ". Allen v. United 
States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). See also Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hang Jury: 
A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 V A. L. REV. 123,143 (1967). For similar evaluations 
of the coercive effect of the Allen charge, see Burrup v. United States, 371 F.2d 556, 559 
(10th Cir. 1967) (Phillips, J., concurring); Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d at 739-41 
(Coleman, J., concurring); Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (Brown, J., dis-
senting); State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960). 
23. See United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 
1013 (1993); United States v. Sawyers, 902 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 501 U.S. 
1253 (1991). 
24. See United States v. Nichols, 820 F.2d 508 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Levas-
seur, 816 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1987); Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d 530 (D.C. 1974); 
Smith v. United States, 542 A 2d 823 (D.C. 1988). 
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arriving at a decision25 The Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals use a modified Allen charge, using a four-prong test to deter-
mine whether the charge was unduly coercive, considering the content 
of the instruction, the length of the period of deliberation, the total 
time of deliberation, and any indicia of pressure or coercion on the 
jurors26 
A number of circuits have adopted the ABA standard or some var-
iation of the standard The Third Circuit has rejected a pure Allen 
charge in favor of an ABA-like standard m United States v Fioravanh,27 
where the court upheld an ABA-type charge to a deadlocked jury 
The Seventh Circuit adopted the ABA standard in United States v 
Sanders,28, while in United States v Smith, the Tenth Circuit approved 
the use of a modified form of the ABA standard winch adds to the 
original language of the standard 29 The Eleventh Circuit has also dis-
approved the Allen charge in United States v Key, labelling it "coer-
cive" and "offensive "30 
In the various states, the Allen charge has been generally rejected 
and, although the trend is toward adopting the language of the ABA 
standard, there is still substantial variation m acceptable language31 
A number of states have disapproved the Allen charge, but have held 
that giving the charge is not reversible error32 Most of the states which 
still accept the Allen charge have modified its language to ameliorate 
its coercive effect33 
Discharge Without Verdict 
Although the common law rule was to the contrary, the modern 
rule is that a trial judge has discretionary power to discharge a jury 
25 See United States v Heath, 970 F 2d 1397 (5th Cir 1992) 
26 See, eg, United States v Cortez, 935 F2d 135 (8th Cir), cert denied, 502 US 1062 
(1992) 
27 412 F 2d 407 (3d Cir), ceit denied, 396 U S 837 (1969) 
28 962 F 2d 660, 665 (7th Cir 1992) 
29 857 F 2d 682 (10th Cir 1988) 
30 811 F 2d 1453 (11th Cir), cert denied, 484 U S 830 (1987) 
31 For examples of states which have adopted the language of the ABA standard, 
see Annot, supra note 21, at § 5 
32 See, eg, State v Perry, 131 Vt 337, 306 A 2d 110 (1973), Jackson v State, 375 So 
2d 558 (Ala Ct App 1979), State v Basker, 198 Kan 242, 424 P 2d 535 (1967) 
33 See, e g, Commonwealth v Rodriquez, 364 Mass 87,300 N E 2d 192 (1973), Kelley 
v State, 51 Wis 2d 641, 187 N W 2d 810 (1971) 
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in any criminal trial without the consent of either party when, after 
sufficient and reasonable time for deliberation, it cannot agree on a 
verdict.34 Section (c) permits discharge when "it appears that there is 
no reasonable probability of agreement." 
The language of this standard—or similar language—is common in 
statutes and rules of court.35 Court decisions likewise take the view 
that a trial judge should not discharge a jury merely because it reports 
that it has not been able to agree, but instead should determine 
whether there is a reasonable prospect of its being able to agree.36 One 
way of making this determination is through questioning of jurors. 
The particular circumstances of the case should also be considered. 
Relevant factors include: the length of deliberation;37 the length of the 
trial;38 and the nature or complexity of the case.39 
Related Standards 
None. 
Commentary 
This standard addresses the situation that may arise if, during the 
jury deliberations, the defendant should decide to change his or her 
34. See, e.g., United States v. Shavin, 287 F.2d 647 (7th Or. 1961); People v. Mays, 23 
111. 2d 520,179 N.E.2d 654 (1962). Cf Illinois v. SommerviUe, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United 
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971). 
35. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 22.4; ARK. STAT. ANN. §43-2140 (1977); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1140 (West 1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.36 (Baldwin 1974); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. P. art. 36.31 (Vernon 1966). 
36. Icenogle, The Menace of the "Hung jury;' 47 A.B.A. J. 280 (1961). 
37. People v. Caradine, 235 Cal. App. 2d 45, 44 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1965). 
38. United States v. FitzGerald, 205 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. 111. 1962). 
39. People v. Mays, 23 111. 2d 520, 179 N.E.2d 654 (1962). 
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1 with that charge to continue their deliberations. So I'll meet 
2 you in the courtroom. 
3 (Recess taken) 
4 COURT BAILIFF: All rise for the jury. 
5 (Jury enters the courtroom) 
6 COURT BAILIFF: Be seated. 
7 THE COURT: All right. We're back on the record in 
8 the matter of the State of Utah vs. Russell David Harry, case 
9 No. 051908113. I want to note for the record that all Counsel 
10 are present, as is Mr. Harry. Members of the jury, I'm going 
11 to ask that you continue your deliberations in an effort to 
12 agree upon a verdict and dispose of this case. I have a few 
13 additional comments I would'like for you to consider as you do 
14 so. 
15 This is an important case. The trial has been 
16 expensive in time, effort and money to both the defense and 
17 the prosecution. If you should fail to agree on a verdict, the 
18 case is left open and must be tried again. Obviously another 
19 trial would only serve to increase the costs to both sides; and 
20 there is no reason to believe that the case can be tried again 
21 by either side better or more exhaustively than it has been 
22 tried before you. 
23 Any future jury must be selected in the same manner 
24 and from the same source as you were chosen; and there is no 
25 reason to believe that the case could ever be submitted to 
-232-
1 eight men and women more conscientious, more impartial, or 
2 more competent to decide it; or that a more clear or clearer 
3 evidence -- excuse me -- or that more or clearer evidence could 
4 be produced on behalf of either side. 
5 In order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result, 
6 you must examine the questions submitted to you with candor 
7 and frankness and with proper deference to and regard for the 
8 opinions of each other. That is to say in conferring together, 
9 each of you should pay due attention and respect to the views 
10 of the others, and listen to each other's arguments with the 
11 disposition to re-examine your own views. 
12 If a substantial majority of your number are for a 
13 conviction, each dissenting juror ought to consider whether a 
14 doubt in his or her own mind is a reasonable one, since it 
15 appears to make no effective impression upon the minds of so 
16 many equally conscientious fellow jurors, who bear the same 
17 responsibility, serve under the same oath, and have heard the 
18 same evidence, with, we may assume, the same attention and 
19 equal desire to arrive at the truth. 
20 On the other hand, if a majority or even a lesser 
21 number of you are for acquittal, the other jurors ought to 
22 seriously ask themselves again, and most thoughtfully, whether 
23 they do not have a reason to doubt the correction of a 
24 judgment, which is not shared by several of their fellow 
25 jurors, and whether they should distrust the weight and 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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sufficiency of evidence which fails to convince several of 
their fellow jurors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
You are not partisans. You are judges; judges of the 
facts. Your sole interest here is to seek the truth from the 
evidence in the case. Remember at all times that no juror is 
expected to yield a conscientious conviction he or she may have 
as to the weight or effect of the evidence; but remember also 
that after full deliberation and consideration of the evidence 
in the case, it is your duty to agree upon a verdict if you can 
do so without surrendering your conscientious conviction. 
You must also remember that if the evidence in the 
case fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
accused should have your unanimous verdict of not guilty. 
In order to make a decision more practicable in all cases 
imposes the burden of proof on one party or the other. In 
this case the burden of proof is on the State. You may be as 
leisurely in your deliberations as the occasion may require, 
and should take all the time which you may feel is necessary, 
including recessing until tomorrow. 
I will ask now that you retire once again, and 
continue your deliberations with these additional comments in 
mind to be applied in conjunction with all of the instructions 
I have previously given to you. Members of the jury, I will 
have this instruction copied and sent in shortly. All rise. 
(Jury exits the courtroom) 
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I'm now going to go over a few preliminary instructions. All are equally important. 
1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: 
Obey the instructions-you're not to reach decisions that go against the law. You may take 
notes, but don't let your note-taking distract you from following the evidence. Also, your notes 
aren't evidence; use them only as an aid to your personal memory. And keep an open mind-don't 
form an opinion about this case until you've heard all of the evidence and the lawyers' summaries 
and considered my final instructions to you on the law. 
2. THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE, THE JURY, AND THE LAWYERS: 
It's my role as judge to supervise the trial and to decide the legal issues. It's your role as 
jurors to decide the factual issues. These issues generally relate to who, what, where, when, and 
how. And it's the role of the lawyers to present evidence. Each lawyer will also try to persuade you 
to accept his/her view of the evidence and to decide the case in favor of his/her client. A word of 
caution: Neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case; that's your role. So don't be influenced 
by what you think our opinions are; rather, you decide the case based upon the law, as explained in 
my final instructions to you, and the evidence presented here in court. 
3. AN OUTLINE OF HOW THE TRIAL WILL PROCEED: 
Opening statements come first. In this portion the lawyers will outline for you what they 
believe the evidence will show. The parties will then present their evidence. The prosecution will 
offer its evidence first followed by the defense. At the end of the evidence portion, I'll provide you 
with the final instructions on the law. The lawyers will then argue the case to you in their closing 
arguments. It's at this time that they'll share with you their respective views of the evidence and 
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how they think you should decide the case. The final step is for you to deliberate until you reach a 
decision. 
4. THE CHARGE AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: 
The defendant in this case has been accused of committing a crime. The accusation is in a 
written document called an "Information". At this time, the clerk is going to read the Information 
aloud. [Information read.] The defendant has answered the Information by saying "not guilty". The 
defendant is presumed to be innocent of all charges. 
5. THE FUNCTION OF THE JURY: 
You must decide whether the prosecution has proven the charge or charges against the 
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a "verdict". Your verdict must be 
based only on the evidence produced in court. And it must be based on facts, not on speculation. 
You may, however, draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. 
6. WHAT IS EVIDENCE: 
Generally speaking, evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a 
disputed fact. Examples include testimony, documents, objects, and photographs. At times the 
lawyers may agree that certain facts exist. You should accept any agreed or stipulated facts as having 
been proved. In limited instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a well-known fact. If this happens, 
I'll explain how you should treat it. Also, under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to give 
opinion testimony. A person who by education, study, or experience has become an expert in any 
art, science, or profession, may give his/her opinion and the reason for it. A layman (or a non-expert) 
is also allowed to express an opinion if it's based on personal observations and helpful to 
understanding his/her testimony of the case. You're not bound to believe anyone's opinion. 
Consider it as you would any other evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves. 
7. WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS EVIDENCE: 
I've explained to you what evidence is; now I'll tell you about some things that don't qualify 
as evidence and that you mustn't consider in reaching your verdict. The Information: The fact that 
formal charges have been filed accusing the defendant of committing a crime is not evidence of guilt. 
Potential punishment: You maybe aware of the offense charged and the range of potential penalties, 
but you shouldn't consider what actual punishment the defendant may receive if found guilty. That's 
for me to decide based upon the applicable law. The lawyers' statements: What the lawyers say 
isn't evidence. Their purpose is to give you a preview of expected evidence and to help you 
understand the evidence from their viewpoint. The right to remain silent: If the defendant chooses 
not to testify, don't consider that as evidence of guilt. The Constitution provides that the defendant 
has the right not to testify and you mustn't draw any negative inferences based upon his/her reliance 
on this right. Personal investigation: Evidence isn't what you can find out on your own. So, don't 
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make personal inspections; don't look for information in books or public or private records; and 
don't view premises, things, or articles not produced in court. And out-of-court information: Don't 
consider anything you may have heard or read about this case in the media or by other out-of-court 
communication. You must rely solely on the evidence that's produced and received in court. 
8. OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE: 
I rule on objections. If I sustain an objection, the evidence is kept out and you shouldn't 
consider it; if I overrule it, the evidence comes in and you may consider it. If I strike evidence, you 
should ignore it. 
9. HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE: 
Once evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about it: whether it should be 
believed, how important it is, and what you can infer or conclude from it. Use your common sense 
in making these decisions. Review all of the evidence. Don't imagine things that have no evidence 
to back them up. And consider the evidence fairly, without any bias, passion, or sympathy toward 
either side. 
10. DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS: 
As each witness testifies, you must decide how much weight to give to his/her testimony. 
Keep in mind that you're not required to believe all that a witness says. And you're entitled to 
believe one witness as against many or many as against one, in keeping with your honest convictions. 
In assessing a witness, it may help to ask yourself questions such as these: Does the witness have 
a bias or motive to testify a certain way? Did the witness make conflicting statements or contradict 
other evidence, and what impression is made by the witness while answering questions? Did the 
witness have a good opportunity to know the facts and the ability to remember them, and is the 
testimony reasonable in light of human experience? 
11. WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE TESTIMONY: 
If you believe that a witness has purposely testified falsely about anything relevant to the 
case, you may disregard not only the false testimony, but all of his/her testimony, unless it is 
corroborated, which means confirmed or supported, by other evidence (in which case you should 
give it the weight you think it deserves). 
12. QUESTIONS BY JURORS DURING THE TRIAL: 
Any juror may direct a question to me or to a witness by writing the question on a piece of 
paper and alerting the bailiff. I'll share the same with the lawyers, who have the right to express an 
opinion as to whether it's proper. If the question is improper, I'll tell you; otherwise, I'll generally 
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allow it. I remind you, however, that the lawyers are trained in putting on the evidence necessary 
to decide this case. But if you feel there's something important that's been missed or that needs 
clarification, you may ask a question by complying with the procedure I've just outlined. 
13. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY: 
The prosecution has the burden of proof. It's the one making the accusations in this case. 
The defendant isn't required to prove innocence-you must start by assuming it. According to the 
law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
is a humane rule intended to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
14. HOW CONVINCED MUST YOU BE TO DECIDE GUILT: 
Before you can give up your assumption that the defendant is innocent, you must be 
convinced that the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
15. WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT: 
The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it's only 
necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the 
prosecution's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's 
guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in 
criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on 
your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the 
crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility 
that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty. 
16. WHAT RULES APPLY TO RECESSES: 
On occasion I'll call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes or longer. During recesses, 
don't talk about this case with anyone-not family, friends, or even each other. And don't mingle 
with the lawyers, the parties, the witnesses, or anyone else connected with the case. You may 
exchange polite greetings with these persons, but don't engage in conversations. Finally, don't read 
about this case in the newspaper or listen to any reports on television or ra^iQ^%^K 
Dated this 19th day of July, 2006. ^ § f$?%$?% 
DENO G. HJJftONAS * < 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RUSSELL DAVID HARRY, 
Defendant, 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 051908113 
Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1: It's now my duty, as judge, to instruct you as to the law that 
applies to this case. And it's your duty, as jurors, to follow that law. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2: You may take the following items only into the jury room: these 
instructions, the exhibits admitted in evidence, your notes, and the verdict form. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3: The first thing to do in the jury room is choose a "Foreperson". 
The Foreperson's duties are to keep order, allow everyone a chance to speak, and represent the jury 
in any communications that you make. The Foreperson has no more power than any other juror in 
deciding what the verdict should be. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4: It's rarely good for a juror, on entering the jury room, to make an 
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When 
that's done, a person's pride may block appropriate consideration of the case. But don't make a 
decision just to agree with everyone else either: your verdict must be your own. Help each other 
arrive at the truth. Use your common memory, common understanding, and common sense. Talk 
about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate. And respect and consider the opinions 
of your fellow jurors. If you're persuaded that a decision you initially made was wrong, then don't 
hesitate to change your mind. Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other 
than honest deliberation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5: If you think that you need more information or a clarification, 
write a note and give it to the bailiff. I'll review it with the lawyers and answer your question, if 
appropriate; however, these instructions, should contain all the information that you need in order 
to reach a verdict based upon the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6: Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You shouldn't 
use this case to correct perceived wrongs in other cases or to express individual or collective views 
about anything other than the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Put a little differently, your verdict 
should reflect the facts, as found by you, applied to the law explained in these instructions and 
shouldn't be distorted by any outside factors or objectives. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7: This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous on 
each element of the offense. When you're all in agreement, then you've reached a verdict and your 
work is finished. At that time, the Foreperson should date and sign the verdict form that reflects your 
decision. The Foreperson should then notify the bailiff that you're ready to return to court. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8: After you've given me the verdict form, the clerk may ask each 
of you about it to make sure that you agree with it. I'll then excuse you. Afterward, you may talk 
about the case with anyone. Likewise, you're not required to talk about it. If anyone insists on 
talking to you about the case when you don't want to, please tell the court clerk. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9: You're instructed that the defendant, Russell David Harry, is 
charged in the Information with the commission of one count of the unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, a 3rd degree felony, and one count of driving under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs, a class B misdemeanor. More specifically, the Information alleges that [Information 
read]. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10: You're not to consider Instruction No. 9 as a statement of facts; 
rather, you're to regard it as a summary of the allegations in the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11: The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not 
guilty denies each of the essential allegations of the counts contained in the Information and casts 
upon the prosecution the burden of proving each to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12: You're instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has been 
arrested, charged with this offense, and held to answer to the charge by a committing magistrate, 
isn't any evidence of guilt or even a circumstance that you should consider in deteraiining guilt or 
innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13: In arriving at a verdict, you shouldn't discuss or consider the 
subject of penalty or punishment. That's a matter for the court and other governmental agencies and 
mustn't in any way affect your decision as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14: All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor 
of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This presumption is not a mere formality, but is a substantial part of the law intended, as far as is 
possible, to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in your minds until you're satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. And, in the case of a reasonable doubt as 
to the defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to an acquittal. 
Also, the burden is always on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
burden never shifts to the defendant for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case 
the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15: Again, the prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you 
were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal 
cases, the prosecution's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's 
guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal 
cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your 
consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime 
charged, you must find him/her guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that 
he/she is not guilty, you must give him/her the benefit of the doubt and find him/her not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16: During the trial, the lawyers asked me to determine whether 
certain evidence might be admitted. You're not to be concerned with the reasons for such requests 
or rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. Whether evidence is admissible is purely 
a question of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, I don't determine what 
weight should be given such evidence, nor do I pass on the credibility of the witness. You're not to 
consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out by me. As to any question 
to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to what the answer might have been 
or as to the reason for the objection. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17: As I've previously explained, you're to try the issues of fact that 
are presented by the allegations in the Information. You should perform this duty uninfluenced by 
pity for or passion or prejudice against the defendant. The law forbids you to be governed by 
sentiment, sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public feeling. Both the prosecution and the defendant 
have a right to expect that you'll conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the 
evidence and apply the law of the case, to reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18: The evidence that you're to consider includes the testimony of 
witnesses, exhibits received into evidence, stipulations of the parties, reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from facts proven in the case, presumptions, if any, as stated in these instructions, and all of 
the facts and circumstances disclosed thereby. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19: You should reconcile conflicts in the evidence as far as you 
reasonably can. But where the conflicts cannot be reconciled, you're the final judges and must 
determine from the evidence what the facts are. You should carefully and conscientiously consider 
and compare all of the testimony and all of the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on any 
issue and determine therefrom what the facts are. You're not bound to believe witnesses unless their 
testimony is reasonable and convincing in view of all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. 
You may believe one witness as against many, or many as against a fewer number, in accordance 
with your honest convictions. If you believe a witness has willfully testified falsely as to any 
material fact in this case, you may disregard the whole of the testimony of such a witness, or you 
may give it such weight as you think it's entitled to. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20: You're the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the 
witnesses, you've a right to take into consideration their bias, interest in the result of the suit, or any 
probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses' 
deportment on the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or 
candor, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You 
should consider these matters together with all of the other facts and circumstances that you may 
believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' statements. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21: You're instructed that the defendant is a competent witness in 
his/her own behalf and his/her testimony should be received and given the same consideration as you 
give to that of any other witness. The fact that he/she stands accused of a crime is no evidence of 
his guilt and is no reason for rejecting his/her testimony. You should weigh the defendant's 
testimony the same as you weigh the testimony of any other witness. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22: The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of 
witnesses to be received as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. 
A person who by education, study, or experience has become an expert in any art, science, or 
profession, may give his/her opinion as to any matter in which the witness is qualified as an expert 
and that is material to the case. You're not bound to believe anyone's opinion. Consider it as you 
would any other evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23: In determining any fact in this case, you shouldn't consider or 
be influenced by anything I've said or done that you may interpret as indicating my views thereon. 
You're the sole and final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, and you must determine 
the facts for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you believe I think. I haven't 
intended to express any opinion on what the proof shows or doesn't show, or what are or what aren't 
the facts in the case. You must follow your own views and not be influenced by my views. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24: If in these instructions any rule, direction, or idea has been stated 
in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, 
you're not to single out any individual point or instruction, and ignore the others; rather, you're to 
consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others. Also, the 
order in which I've given the instructions has no significance as to their relative importance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25: I've tried to give you instructions embodying all of the rules of 
law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict. The applicability of some 
of these instructions will depend upon the conclusions that you reach as to what the facts are. As 
to any such mstruction, the fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion by 
me that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts are. If an instruction applies only to 
a state of facts that you find doesn't exist, disregard the instruction. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26: Courts of justice recognize and admit two classes of evidence, 
upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base their findings, whether favorable to the 
prosecution or to the defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt the evidence, 
whether of one kind or the other or a combination of both, must carry the convincing quality required 
by law. One class of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. The law makes 
no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to their 
effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for such convincing force as it may carry and 
accepts each as a reasonable method of proof. Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in 
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with any of his/her own physical senses, 
perceived such conduct or any part thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was 
perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, 
insofar as it shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove 
by reasonable inference the innocence or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in 
arriving at a verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27: I've permitted you to take notes. Many courts don't, and a word 
of caution is in order. There's always a tendency to attach undue importance to matters that one has 
written down, but some testimony that's considered unimportant at the time presented, and thus not 
written down, takes on greater importance later in the trial in light of all the evidence presented. 
Consequently, your notes are only a tool to aid your own individual memory and you shouldn't 
compare your notes with other jurors in determining the content of any testimony or in evaluating 
the importance of any evidence. Your notes are not evidence and are by no means a complete outline 
of the proceedings or a list of the highlights of the trial. Above all, your memory should be your 
greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate and render a decision in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28: You shouldn't consider as evidence any statement of counsel 
made during the trial unless such statement was made as a stipulation conceding the existence of a 
fact or facts. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 29: To constitute the crime charged in the Information, there must 
be the joint operation of two essential elements: conduct prohibited by law and the appropriate 
culpable mental state or states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law. Before a defendant may 
be found guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the Information and that the defendant 
committed such conduct with the culpable mental state required for such offense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30: The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind and 
connotes a purpose in so acting, hitent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by 
direct and positive evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements, and 
circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 31: Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what 
prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which an act is 
done or omitted. Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not be proven. The 
motive of an accused is immaterial except insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your 
determination of state of mind or intent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 32: "On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or is 
near the day alleged in the Information. "Conduct" means an act or omission. "Act" means a 
voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. "Omission" means a failure to act when there is 
a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
[INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3 3 
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the Information. Each charge and 
the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The fact that you may find the 
accused guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged should not control your verdict as to 
any other offense charged. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 7 
A person engages in conduct intentionally or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct 
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. .3$ 
You are instructed that you cannot find Russell David Harry guilty of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance unless the state proves all of the following elements to be 
true beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about September 16, 2005, in Salt Lake County; 
2. Russell David Harry; 
3. Knowingly and intentionally; 
4. Possessed; 
5. Methamphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance. 
If the prosecution has proved each one of the foregoing elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find Russell David Harry guilty. However, if the prosecution 
has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
Russell David Harry not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that "knowing" possession of a controlled substance is more than the 
mere handling of the substance but requires proof that the accused possessed the substance with 
knowledge of its narcotic character. 
In addition, you are instructed that "intentional" possession of a controlled substance is 
more than the mere handling of the substance but requires exercising dominion and control over 
the substance with the intent to control its use or management. 
Before a conviction may enter, the prosecution must prove to your unanimous satisfaction 
and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he possessed a controlled substance and 
that he actually intended to control its use or management. Otherwise you must find the 
Defendant Not Guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that "possession'1 or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, 
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, obtaining, or the application, 
inlialation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from distribution, of 
controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled 
substances. 
Actual physical possession is not necessary to convict a defendant of possession of a 
controlled substance. A conviction may also be based upon "constructive possession." 
"Constructive possession" exists where the controlled substance is subject to the 
defendant's dominion and control. 
To find the defendant had "constructive possession" of a controlled substance, it is 
necessary to prove there was a sufficient nexus or connection between the accused and the 
controlled substance to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the controlled substance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. . ? ? g 
In order to prove constructive possession, the state must demonstrate to your 
unanimous satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt that the controlled substance was subject 
to Mr. Harry's dominion and control. 
It is not enough for the state to prove Mr. Harry's knowledge of and ability to 
control the alleged controlled substance if there is no evidence that Mr. Harry intended to make 
use of that knowledge and ability. 
In determining whether Mr. Harry had dominion and control, and the intent to 
constructively possess the controlled substance, you should consider all facts and circumstances. 
Ownership or occupancy of the property where the alleged controlled substance was 
found are important factors, but are not conclusive, especially if the ownership or occupancy is 
not exclusive. 
The presence or absence of incriminating statements made by Mr. Harry are also 
relevant. 
If the items were found in an area where Mr. Harry has privacy and control, or in an 
area where many people have access, this would be relevant. 
If the alleged controlled substance was found with Mr. Harry's property or someone 
else's, these factors should influence your decision. 
Before a conviction may enter, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Harry intended to possess the controlled substance as his own. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5i 
You are instructed that Methamphetamme is, and was at the time of the alleged offense, a 
controlled substance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Jl 
The State is not required to prove any specific amount of a controlled substance to show 
possession of a controlled substance, any amount is sufficient. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
"Operate" means to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle. 
"Driving" is the every-day definition as you may understand it. It means "to urge forward 
under guidance, compel to go in a particular direction or direct the course of." 
"Actual physical control" in its ordinary sense means existing or present bodily restraint, 
directing influence, domination, or regulation. You may consider whether the defendant 
occupied the driver's position behind the steering wheel; whether the defendant had possession of 
the ignition key; the position of the automobile; whether the automobile's motor was running; 
whether the defendant was the vehicle's sole occupant; the apparent ability to start and move the 
vehicle; how the car got to where it was found; and whether the defendant drove it there in 
determining if the defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle. 
You are instructed that to be in "actual physical control of a motor vehicle," the defendant 
need not be exercising conscious volition with regard to the vehicle, and the vehicle need not be 
in motion, so long as the defendant, of her own choice, placed herself behind the wheel. 
Whether or not the vehicle's engine is running is not critical to the determination of 
whether a person is in "physical control" of the said vehicle. A person may be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle if that person is in the vehicle, behind the wheel. 
t 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ j 
Under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs as that expression is used here, covers not 
only the well-known and easily-recognized conditions and degrees of intoxication, it also covers 
any perceptible abnormal, mental, or physical condition of a degree which renders a person 
incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle which is the result of indulging in the ingestion of 
intoxicants. 
The State is not bound to prove that the defendant was drunk or intoxicated, as those 
tenns are commonly understood, but only that while driving or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle in this state, she was under the influence of intoxicants to a degree which rendered 
him incapable of safely driving the vehicle. 
O 
INSTRUCTION NO H^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Russell David Harry, of the offense of Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, as charged in the information, you must find from 
all of the evidence and beyond a leasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements 
of that offense. 
1. That on or about the 16th day of September, 2005, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah; 
2. That the defendant, Russell David Harry, operated or was m actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle, and 
3. That while in control of such vehicle, the defendant was under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or combination theieof, to such a degree that the defendant could 
not safely drive said vehicle, 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence m this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Driving or in Actual Physical Control of a Vehicle While Under the 
Influence of Alcohol and/or Dmgs. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty S&Xc:f • < s 
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